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ABSTRACT:
A new and powerful systems architecture is driving corporate
governance. This architecture will improve board of directors’ decisionmaking, strengthen compliance and risk management protocols, empower
gatekeepers such as lawyers and accountants to better monitor, and enhance
the social contract between business and society. The purpose of this article
is to promote a systems approach to decision-making in matters of corporate
governance, highlight the importance given to systems by recent Delaware
courts, and present recommendations for boards of directors to optimally
situate themselves within an effective organization-wide system of
governance.
INTRODUCTION
A new and powerful systems architecture is driving corporate
governance. This architecture will improve board of directors’ decisionmaking, strengthen compliance and risk management protocols, and
empower gatekeepers such as lawyers and accountants to better monitor the
enterprise. This perspective is not only underdeveloped in the literature,1 but
comes at an ideal time. A subtle but powerful turn toward systems thinking
has recently appeared in judicial opinions, which the academic literature has
yet to recognize. Recognizing the systems turn in corporate governance and
incorporating explicit systems protocols in judicial practice will dramatically
improve the evolution of governance law and provide boards with badly
needed certainty on how to prevent needless liability from shareholder
litigation.
A system is a comprehensive and multilayered framework of input,
processes, and outputs that obtain, manage, and deliver information to others
1. See, e.g., Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems
Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 600 (2018) (noting that “systems theory
currently is not a staple of contemporary corporate law and governance discussions.”); Mariel
Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and
its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 526 (2006) (stating that “[d]espite such
developments in other disciplines, the application of systems thinking to law has been
comparatively limited”). This manuscript advocates for a systems architecture in corporate
governance at the firm-level. For a recent macro view of corporate governance infrastructure
see Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121 COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2021) (“More specifically, we describe the corporate governance
machine and its three reinforcing components: law, institutions, and culture.”).
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who in turn return new information to the system which is processed and
disseminated through the organization.2 A systems architecture perspective
not only considers a system’s logical flow and design, but also embraces the
conceptual structure of the system, its functional outcomes, and needs of
important stakeholders.3 It is this broader perspective to systems thinking,
largely absent in the literature, that we incorporate in this manuscript.
The absence of a systems approach is not just a theoretical problem.
The absence of this approach can be fatal, and it can start with something as
innocuous as ice cream. Blue Bell Creameries is one of the largest and oldest
manufacturers of ice cream products in the United States. 4 Blue Bell
appeared to have a robust compliance program: outside firms audited the
company, regulators inspected its facilities, and safety manuals guided
worker conduct. Yet regarding compliance, Blue Bell was a company adrift.
In spite of its critical importance to the business, the board of directors held
periodic meetings with no board-level discussion of food safety.5 Surely,
their compliance program would protect them from harm—managers had
operations under control, and everything would be fine.
In 2015, Blue Bell products became contaminated with a dangerous
bacteria that thrived in cold and damp environments, causing widespread
infection including ten hospitalizations and three deaths amongst Blue Bell
consumers.6 Blue Bell’s board of directors, despite their essential role in
2. See infra notes 18–24 and accompanying text (summarizing the various definitions
of a system).
3. See Hannu Jaakkola & Bernhard Thalheim, Architecture-Driven Modeling
Methodologies, 22 MODELING & KNOWLEDGE BASES 97, 98 (2011) (listing what the derived
models of a system’s architecture represent). See also John Klein & Hans van Vilet, A
Systematic Review of System-of-Systems Architecture Research, in QOSA ‘13: PROC. OF THE
9TH INT’L ACM SIGSOFT CONF. ON QUALITY OF SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURES 13, 13 (2013)
(“We define the architecture of a system as the set of structures needed to reason about the
system, which comprise elements, relations among them, and properties of both.”); MLC
Federal Inc. Cont. Cas. Fed., B-254696, ¶ 108,011, at n.3, 1994 WL 17099983 (Comp. Gen.
Jan. 10, 1994) (“The architecture of a system defines its attributes . . . that is, the conceptual
structure and functional behavior of the machine, as distinct from the organization of the data
flow, the logical design, the physical design, and the performance of any particular
implementation.”); John W.L. Ogilvie, Defining Computer Programs Parts Under Learned
Hand’s Abstractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91 MICH. L. REV. 526,
534 (1992) (“[A] system architecture begins to describe how the program operates. The
system architecture describes the program in terms of various modules and their
interconnections.”).
4. See The Little Creamery, BLUE BELL CREAMERIES, https://www.bluebell.com/thelittle-creamery/#our-history [https://perma.cc/YPN9-WKKX] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021)
(providing background on the company).
5. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822 (Del. 2019).
6. Cyrus B. Parks & Laura B. Cardinal, Family Firms and Stakeholder Management:
Crisis at Blue Bell Ice Cream, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO RISK, CRISIS AND
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leadership and monitoring the organization, did not address the multiple and
troubling failures found by FDA inspections years before the fatal listeria
outbreak. 7 These included improper disinfection procedures, mixing of
condensation and debris in the manufacturing process, and frequent
problems with contamination.8
In response to these failures, a shareholder brought a derivative suit
against Blue Bell in the Delaware courts, alleging in part that the board of
directors breached their duty of loyalty pursuant to standards set in the
seminal decision In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation
(Caremark).9 What is now known as a Caremark claim is one of the hardest
corporate law claims to plead and prove against a board of directors.10 The
Court of Chancery of Delaware duly dismissed plaintiff’s Caremark
allegations against Blue Bell due to insufficient evidence that the board
breached its duties to the company.11 That changed on appeal. The Supreme
Court of Delaware in Marchand v. Barnhill surprisingly reversed the lower
court’s dismissal and allowed plaintiff’s Caremark claim to proceed.12 The
court’s core reasoning was based upon the principle that Blue Bell lacked an
interlinked, interdependent, and coordinated system of board-level
compliance and monitoring in the organization.13 The court concluded that
Blue Bell’s board did not meet its minimum duties toward company
shareholders, and allowed plaintiff’s claim to proceed.14
Delaware courts have been signaling for years that a system of
compliance is what would be expected from boards in order to avoid liability
under Caremark. However, only quite recently have the courts articulated
the importance of systems thinking so prominently. Boards can no longer
assume that the mere presence of a compliance function, and sporadic
engagement with that function, will shield them from potential liability. A
systems approach to governance by boards is now a necessity. Boards must
ensure the presence of a comprehensive framework that receives information
from internal and external stakeholders, transmits that information up
through the enterprise to the board of directors, and then implements
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 341, 341–42 (Robert P. Gephart, Jr., ed. 2019).
7. Id. at 342.
8. Id.
9. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.1996).
10. See infra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of proving
Caremark claims).
11. Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20,
2018).
12. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019).
13. Id. at 823–24.
14. Id. at 824.
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compliance mandates from an engaged and proactive board of directors. If
the Blue Bell board had such a rigorous program in place, three of their
customers might be alive today.
The purpose of this article is to develop a systems architecture approach
to decision-making in matters of corporate governance, highlight the
importance given to systems by recent Delaware courts, and show how
boards can optimally situate themselves within the emerging regulatory
reality of systems-based corporate governance. Part I introduces systems
thinking and its potential for transforming governance in organizations. Part
II shows how systems thinking in the Marchand decision, and the four lower
court siblings that followed, collectively referred to as “the governance
quartet”15 helped influence the courts’ decisions to let their Caremark claims
survive a motion to dismiss. Part III reinforces the systems turn in corporate
governance by highlighting a judicial shift from rigid gatekeeping toward a
holistic understanding of the board and its responsibilities to the firm.
Shifting our focus to the board of directors, Part IV illuminates how
boards can build a systems architecture of corporate governance. By
responding to frequent calls in the literature to open the “black box” of board
operations,16 we theorize the board of directors as not just a monolith but a
collection of coequal individuals who not only collaborate toward a common
goal, but also display group behaviors such as coalitions, groupthink, social
isolation, and dissent.17 We show how applying a systems architecture to a

15. Following Marchand, four Caremark claims survived motions to dismiss in
Delaware’s Court of Chancery between October 2019 and August 2020. Although these four
represent a small number of the Caremark claims brought before that court, they are
significant given how rare it is for such claims to survive a motion to dismiss. See infra note
91 (highlighting the difficulty in meeting the standard of care required by Caremark to
succeed on a claim). These cases are: In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No.
2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019), Inter-Mtg. Grp. USA, Inc. v.
Armstrong, C.A. No. 2017-0030-TMR, 2020 WL 756965 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020), Hughes
v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020), and Teamsters
Local 443 Health Svcs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, C.A. No. 2019-0816-SG, 2020 WL 5028065
(Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020). We refer to these four cases collectively as the “governance
quartet” because they highlight the need for systems architecture in corporate governance.
16. See, e.g., Bernard C. Bailey & Simon I. Peck, Boardroom Strategic Decision-Making
Style: Understanding the Antecedents, 21 CORP. GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 131, 131 (2013)
(referencing the “black box”); Hans van Ees, Jonas Gabrielsson & Morten Huse, Toward a
Behavioral Theory of Corporate Governance, 17 CORP. GOV.: AN INT’ L REV. 307, 315 (2009)
(similar); Amedeo Pugliese et al., Boards of Directors’ Contribution to Strategy: A Literature
Review and Strategic Agenda, 17 CORP. GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 292, 293 (2009) (similar);
Andrew M. Pettigrew, on Studying Managerial Elites, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163, 175
(1992) (similar).
17. See, e.g., Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: Understanding Boards as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT.
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board’s decision-making not only discourages potentially harmful group
effects but also augments the board’s ability to function at its highest level
of corporate governance, benefitting employees, shareholders, and society at
large. Part V concludes.
I. SYSTEMS THINKING IN ORGANIZATIONS
This Part introduces systems thinking. Part I.A. summarizes the history
and development of systems and their various applications in business,
government, and academia. While there are many different definitions of a
system, most concentrate around a few key concepts which will be relied on
in this Article. Part I.B. examines systems thinking in the legal environment
of business. This subpart shows that systems concepts and ideas have played
a limited though promising role in legal scholarship, particularly in the areas
of corporate law and corporate governance.
A. A History and Development of the Systems Thinking
One of the many useful definitions of a system is that it is “an
arrangement of physical components, or a set or collection of things,
connected or related in such a manner as to form and/or act as an entire unit,
an entity or whole.”18 A system has also been defined as a “complex unity
formed of many often diverse parts subject to a common plan or serving a
common purpose.” 19 Not merely a collection of things, systems have a

REV. 489, 492 (1999) (discussing board effectiveness).
18. Robert D. Hart, A Natural Ecosystem Analog Approach to the Design of a
Successional Crop System for Tropical Forest Environments, 12 BIOTROPICA 73, 73 (1980).
A system can also be defined more symbolically: “‘A system S = (T, R) where T is a set of
things and R is a relation defined on T.’ The things (Ti) are interdependent or interrelated and
form a unified whole.” Stephanie M. White, Systems Theory, Systems Thinking, in IEEE SYS
CONF. PROC. 1 (2015), available at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7116787 [https://per
ma.cc/53MY-BQXA]. Systems have been criticized as difficult to define, in part because
they are so widely applicable that only the broadest terms can meaningfully encompass what
a system is and does. See HITESH GUPTA, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM: AN INSIGHT
14 (Int’l Book House Pvt. ed., 2011) (stating that “[t]here are more than a hundred definitions
of the word system”); Alexander Backlund, The Definition of System, 29 KYBERNETES 444,
444 (2000) (“There are many definitions of system.”).
19. Vermont Law School’s First Annual Alumni Energy Symposium – Symposium
Proceedings November 6, 2014, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 274 (2015) (remarks of Michael
Myers, New York State Attorney General’s office); Pamela Samuelson, Questioning
Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193, 209–10 & n.114 (2007) (citing popular
dictionary definition of a system); Keith Myers, Medical Errors: Causes, Cures, and
Capitalism, 16 J.L. HEALTH 255, 260 (2001-02) (similar).
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defined form, function, and purpose. 20 Systems have a specific design that
can be measured and evaluated according to the outputs that the system
generates.21 A system relies upon not only components that make up the
system, but also the interactions between those components that make the
system work.22 The word system originates from the Greek verb sunistánai,
which meant “to cause to stand together.” 23 Thinking about concepts as
systems is also “one of the most powerful ideas in science” and is a “unique”
and “broadly useful” method for thinking and learning.24
The earliest systems approaches were developed in the military during
the second world war.25 In the 1950s, Professor Jay Forrester at MIT created
the Systems Dynamics Group to use computer simulations to predict and to
illustrate systems behavior. 26 One of his first applications of systems
dynamics involved a business, specifically management of production,
inventories, headcount, and profit at a division of General Electric.27 Early
experts like Forrester perceive systems as involving patterns of behavior
produced by policies that created repercussions elsewhere in the
organization. 28 Forrester also presciently perceived that the purpose of
system or simulation was not to provide a specific answer, but build a process

20. DONELLA H. MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS: A PRIMER 11 (2008).
21. Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 1, at 598–99.
22. MICHAEL C. JACKSON, SYSTEMS THINKING: CREATIVE HOLISM FOR MANAGERS 3
(2003).
23. Simon Bell & Stephen Morse, Systems Thinking and Gauging Sustainable
Development, in SYSTEMS FOR SUSTAINABILITY: PEOPLE, O RGANIZATIONS, AND
ENVIRONMENTS 407, 408 (Frank A. Stowell et al. eds., 1997).
24. Rosemary Hipkins et al., The Interplay of Context and Concepts in Primary School
Children’s Systems Thinking, 42 J. BIOL. EDUC. 73, 73 (2008) (citing JAMES RUTHERFORD &
ANDREW AHLGREN, SCIENCE FOR ALL AMERICANS (1990)); Barry Richmond, Systems
Thinking/System Dynamics: Let’s Just Get on With It, 10 SYSTEM DYNAMICS REV. 135, 135
(1994).
25. Thomas P. Hughes & Agatha C. Hughes, Introduction, in SYSTEMS, EXPERTS, AND
COMPUTERS: THE SYSTEMS APPROACH IN MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING, WORLD WAR II
AND AFTER 2 (Thomas P. Hughes & Agatha C. Hughes eds., 2000). However, it can be argued
that systems thinking has been present as far back as ancient societies where writings on
Roman engineering and water supplies applied a systemic lens. M.A. Sinclair, Ergonomics
Issues in Future Systems, 50 ERGONOMICS 1957, 1958 (2007). According to this source, the
first relevant use of the word “system” appeared in 1619 in a discussion of astronomy and
planets. Id.
26. What is Systems Thinking?, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.c
om/resources/knowledge/strategy/systems-thinking/ [https://perma.cc/AMA9-98UD]. See
also David C. Lane, A Model Simulator: The Lives of Jay W. Forrester, 12 J. SIMULATION 90,
92–93 (2018).
27. Lane, supra note 26, at 92.
28. See Lane, supra note 26, at 95 (explaining one view of systems’ influences and
implications).
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through which managers could interact, learn, and then develop a shared
basis for action.29
During the 1960s and 1970s a systems approach became more
aggressively embedded in organizational thinking.30 Scholars of the period
highlighted the importance of perceiving organizations as systems. 31 An
organization, as scholars of the day described, was perceived as an “open
system which, from the human point of view, converts individual needs and
expectations into outputs.” 32 Systems were understood as not only
mechanistically efficient, but also helpful for improving the management of
inputs, utilizations of outputs, and design systems processes in order to have
the optimal fit for the organizations they serve. 33 Systems were also
understood as serving the needs of the broader environment in the
organizational context.34
As systems applications matured in the 1970s and 1980s, streams of
research broke off into different subfields such as systems engineering,
cybernetics, critical systems thinking, and mathematical approaches to
systems thinking.35 More recent and modern contributions of systems theory
to a variety of fields have both broadened and deepened the applicants of
systems research.36 Systems theory also found applications in business subfields such as strategy, knowledge management, the environment, health,
and corporate social responsibility. 37
Today, systems typically possess two or more individual elements that
are distinct from one another.38 These elements are the component parts of
any system and constitute the basis upon which further traits of a system are
organized.
Furthermore, systems take these component parts and

29. Lane, supra note 26, at 95.
30. Steven A. Cavaleri, In Search of a Pragmatic Systems Method, 67 J. NEW PARADIGM
RSCH. 266, 269 (2011).
31. Id.
32. Michael Beer & Edgar F. Huse, A Systems Approach to Organizational Development,
8 J. APP. BEHAV. SCI. 79, 85 (1972).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. John Mingers & Leroy White, A Review of The Recent Contribution of Systems
Thinking to Operational Research and Management Science, 207 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RSCH.
1147, 1147 (2010); M.C. Jackson & P. Keys, Towards a System of Systems Methodologies,
35 J. OPERATIONAL RSCH. SOC’Y 473, 481 (1984) (discussing the then current “[o][perational]
[r][esearch] in crisis” debate and its relevance to different problem context and problem
solving methodologies).
36. Mingers & White, supra note 35, at 1147–53 (surveying a variety of systems research
methods and their history and recent developments).
37. Mingers & White, supra note 35, at 1152–57.
38. MEADOWS, supra note 20, at 11.
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interconnect them in some way. Elements that are interconnected share some
relationship with one another that is greater than what can be found by
chance.39 This interconnectedness between individual components results in
these components creating their own patterns of behavior over time.40
Modern systems contain processes that are fully integrated with one
another. In integrated systems, the whole of a system is greater than the sum
of its parts, and systems create synergies through how the parts of the system
interact with one another. 41 Integrated systems generate new behaviors,
functions, or outputs that would have been unrealized without a functioning
system in place.42
Systems also operate toward a goal or central objective.43 This central
objective serves as the purpose for why the system functions, though such
purpose may not be expressed explicitly except through the operation of the
system itself. 44 Systems can be nested within one another, creating subsystems inside of broader systems that function together.45 Systems are also
resilient, and are able to avoid, survive, and recover from disruptive events.46
Finally, and quite significantly, systems are able to evaluate and prioritize
systems processes by level of criticality. A critical system is one whose

39. See Saskia Kunnen & Paul van Geert, General Characteristics of a Dynamic Systems
Approach, in A DYNAMIC SYSTEMS APPROACH TO ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 15, 18–19
(Saskia Elske Kunnen ed. 2012) (comparing systems to “networks”).
40. Patricia Briscoe, Global Systems Thinking in Education to End Poverty: Systems
Leaders with Concerted Push, 43 INT’L STUD. EDUC. ADMIN. 5, 7 (2015).
41. Roald P. Verhoeff et al., The Theoretical Nature of Systems Thinking. Perspectives
on Systems Thinking in Biology Education, 40 FRONTIERS IN EDUC. 1, 5 (2018) (“In the holistic
perspective the system as a whole is emphasized, and complex systems learning is aimed at
understanding . . . phenomena as emerging from the dynamic interactions between
components across different levels of organization.”); Rajneesh Chowdhury, Healthcare
Knowledge Management and Information Technology: A Systems Understanding, in
HEALTHCARE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT: ISSUES, ADVANCES AND SUCCESSES 42 (Rajeev Bali
& Ashish Dwivedi, eds., 2007).
42. See Kurt Klingensmith & Azad M. Madni, Resilience Concepts for Architecting an
Autonomous Military Vehicle System-of-Systems, in D ISCIPLINARY CONVERGENCE IN SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING RESEARCH 65, 71 (Azad M. Madni et al. eds., 2018) (reviewing the many
benefits of systems implementation).
43. See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 1, at 599 (stating that a core characteristic of a
system is that “the elements operate as a unified whole to serve a given function or purpose”).
See also APRIL J. WELLS, GRID APPLICATION SYSTEMS DESIGN 198 (2008) (“Every system has
a central objective.”).
44. MEADOWS, supra note 20, at 14.
45. MEADOWS, supra note 20, at 15–16.
46. Scott Jackson & Timothy L.J. Ferris, Resilience Principles for Engineered Systems,
16 SYS.’ ENGINEERING 152, 153 (2013) (evaluating various principles for their capacity to
contribute to avoidance, survival, or recovery behavior in systems).
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failure would result in a serious impact on its functioning.47 The level of
criticality of a system determines how much time and effort is invested in
ensuring that the system functions correctly. 48 Systems cognizant of
criticality can allocate limited resources to protecting critical processes from
unexpected degradation.
Not only is understanding systems characteristics important, but
adopting a systems way of thinking is necessary to fully understand how a
system architecture works. Systems thinking is a process for thinking about
systems.49 Systems thinking begins with an awareness of feedback between
independent actors and how that loops in feedback and counteracts or
otherwise balances one another.50 This awareness enables comprehension of
multiple perspectives on the scope of a problem.51 In time, systems thinking
perceives the vast and complex interrelationships between things and
observes patterns of change rather than merely snapshots of activity. 52
Ultimately, systems thinking powerfully simplifies complex entities by
enabling viewers to see the deeper designs of an entity that underlie its
activity. 53 Such insight can illuminate the core of how a system and its
architecture work, and enable the viewer to predict the impact of change on
a system’s operation and goals.54
A systems approach is essential thinking for organizations. As one
leader in systems thinking presciently explains:
As our personal relationships, technologies, jobs, institutions and
communities continue to grow increasingly complex and
interdependent, the occurrence of [problems that impact beyond
their own immediate area] will increase. . . . As interdependency
increases, we must learn to learn in a new way. It’s not good
47. Cf. Kristian Cedervall Lauta, Regulating a Moving Nerve: On Legally Defining
Critical Infrastructure, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 176, 178–79 & n.11 (2015) (defining a critical
infrastructure from a government perspective as one “whose disruption, failure or destruction
would have a serious impact on the functioning of society, the economy or the state”).
48. See Alan Burns & Robert I. Davis, A Survey of Research into Mixed Criticality
Systems, 50 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 1, 2 (2017) (“The criticality of a component
determines the level of rigour applied in the design and analysis used to determine its correct
functionality and resource usage.”).
49. Ross P. Arnold & Jon P. Wade, A Definition of Systems Thinking: A Systems
Approach, 44 PROCEDIA COMPUT. SCI. 669, 670 (2015) (“Systems thinking is, literally, a
system of thinking about systems.”) (emphasis in original).
50. PETER M SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING
ORGANIZATION 73 (2006).
51. Arnold & Wade, supra note 49, at 673.
52. SENGE, supra note 50, at 73.
53. SENGE, supra note 50, at 73.
54. Arnold & Wade, supra note 49, at 673.
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enough simply to get smarter and smarter about our particular
“piece of the rock”. We must have a common language and
framework for sharing our specialized knowledge, expertise and
experience with “local experts” from other parts of the web. . . . In
short, interdependency demands systems thinking. Without it, the
evolutionary trajectory that we’ve been following since we
emerged from the primordial soup will become increasingly less
viable.55
Systems thinking is a method by which individuals can understand this
interdependency and respond to it in a way that effectively meets whatever
challenge is presented.
B. Systems Thinking in the Legal Environment of Business
Although systems thinking originated in quantitative fields, this
approach is just starting to take root in qualitatively-driven legal
scholarship. 56 The recent literature is coming to accept corporations as
complex and interactive entities that function in a systems architecture.57 A
corporation is essentially a system that comprises different subsystems such
55. BARRY RICHMOND, SYSTEMS THINKING: FOUR KEY QUESTIONS 3–4 (1991), http://stat
ic.clexchange.org/ftp/documents/whyk12sd/Y_1993-05STFourKeyQuestions.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/7AVC-AGYW].
56. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, A Systems Theory of Fragmentation and
Harmonization, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3–5 (2016) (highlighting contributions of
systems theory to international law); Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking
Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
503 (2006) (applying a systems approach to litigation finance); James Salzman et al.,
Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 WYO. L. REV. 253, 270–71 & n.51 (2002) (stating that “authors
have used a systems approach to examine corporate law, civic republicanism, constitutional
decision making, jurisprudence, private capital raising, and many other fields” and citing
sources); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 512–
20 (1997) (offering examples of how systems thinking can improve judicial process); Charles
J. Pope, Domestic Violence and the Courts—The Systems Approach, 73 MICH. B.J. 946, 948
(1994) (advocating a “cross systems” approach that brings together various stakeholders and
coordinates responses to domestic violence). See also Meredith J. Ross, A “Systems”
Approach to Clinical Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 779, 781 (2013) (applying a
“systems approach” to discrimination which the author defines as a “emphasis on teaching
law students how particular systems-such as the criminal justice system, the mental health
system, or the juvenile justice system-work at a day-to-day operational level. This approach
encompasses both skills acquisition and social justice goals.”).
57. Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90
TEMP. L. REV. 727, 729 (2018) (“As many corporate governance scholars have come to accept,
corporations are complex interactive systems of processes, routines, and feedback, the
efficacy of which cannot be taken for granted and hence becomes the crucial focus of the CEO
and senior management team.”).

2021]

TOWARD A SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE

95

as a management team, finance department, and information technology.58
These systems interact through processes in order to achieve the
corporation’s goals.59 Corporations can also be perceived as part of larger
systems such as a national economy or private conglomerate.60
Regarding corporate governance, no part of governance can be
understood on its own, but only within the larger framework to which it
contributes.61 As a result, the “corporate governance system compris[es] a
wide array of complementary institutions, incentive structures, constraints,
and practices that work together to create a whole that is greater than the sum
of its parts.”62 More recently, systems theory has been applied to corporate
law to show that managerial accountability erodes when shareholder value
is perceived through a long-term lens.63 Systems theory is then applied in
order to develop a novel and more unified theory of understanding
corporations.64
Today, a small but promising literature applies systems theory to
compliance and its practices. Compliance has a variety of stakeholders, such
as regulators, firm, and management—inter-organizational structures that
play a role in influencing a compliance system and to which a compliance
function must respond.65 A compliance function must also interact with, and
be informed by, the legal environment of business in which it operates.
Cases, statutes, regulations, and other sources of law are themselves a large
system of rules and principles.66 This system is not only expansive, but also
adaptable in that numerous components interact with one another and adapt
themselves to changing mandates from society.67
From this perspective, two systems interact with one another. The
necessary complexity, and even unnecessary convolution,68 of laws relevant

58. Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 1, at 602.
59. Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 1, at 602.
60. Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 1, at 602.
61. Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 1055, 1076 (2004).
62. Id. at 1075–76.
63. Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 1, at 583.
64. Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 1, at 583.
65. David Orozco, A Systems Theory of Compliance Law, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 244, 270–
90 (2020). Systems theory is also valuable to regulators who can use such thinking to help
achieve regulatory excellence. Agnus Corbett, A Systems Approach to Regulatory Excellence,
in ACHIEVING REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 255, 256 (Cary Coglianese ed. 2017).
66. Salzman et al., supra note 56, at 270. See also Lynn M. LoPucki, supra note 56, at
488–89 (referring to judiciary use of systems).
67. Salzman et al., supra note 56, at 270–71.
68. Robert C. Bird, VUCA, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 367, 414 (2018) (defining convolution
as “any complexity within a given system that is either unnecessary or inhibitory to the
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to business can inflate the costs necessary to comply with legal rules.69 Firms
may be forced to spend significant resources to interpret and apply complex
external rules, and may even experience frustrating dilemmas where
successful compliance with one regulation frustrates the firm’s capacity to
comply with another regulation.70 The result can be a cascading effect of
feedback loops, whereby the compliance function is constantly responding
to changes from other parts of the organization in order to meet the demands
of external legal mandates.71
Further sharpening the understanding of compliance as a system,
compliance has been theorized as a function of a variety of external factors
that exert either a positive or negative force on internal compliance
behavior.72 This view perceives compliance as a system of interlinked and
interdependent forces that combine to produce a variety of outcomes within
the enterprise.73 The effects of these forces are intermediated by economic
determinants and institutional determinants that impact how compliance
practices will ultimately be implemented. 74 An effectively functioning
system must be able to adapt to these changing forces, respond to stakeholder
demands, such as a new regulatory regime, and swiftly incorporate those
demands through it organization.75
Looking at the compliance function from a business perspective, the
success or failure of the compliance function is at least as much a
management function as it is a legal function.76 Most management functions
perceive business functional areas as systems to be developed and
managed.77 The same should apply to compliance. Compliance is more than
“legal lite”, but rather a complex business function that warrants the same
sophisticated treatment as other functional areas.
Compliance functions, processes, and goals fit squarely within the
definition of a system. 78 A compliance function is a dynamic and
evolutionary system of processes that interdepend and interact with one
system’s essential functions”).
69. Salzman et al., supra note 56, at 271.
70. Salzman et al., supra note 56, at 272.
71. Salzman et al., supra note 56, at 272.
72. Orozco, supra note 65, at 292.
73. Orozco, supra note 65, at 292.
74. Orozco, supra note 65, at 292.
75. See J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 887–88
(2008) (illustrating how systems and legal theory can intertwine).
76. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451,
459 (2003).
77. Id. at 459–60.
78. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 291 (2017).
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another. A firm’s compliance system is unique to itself and responds to the
firm’s own “legal mix” of legal and regulatory challenges.79 Compliance
functions are also laden with processes and protocols that enable them to
receive information from and communicate with various stakeholders in the
organization. As a result, compliance as a discipline can benefit from
systems thinking as much as any other business function in the organization.
II. SYSTEMS THINKING IN CAREMARK CLAIMS: MARCHAND V. BARNHILL
AND THE GOVERNANCE QUARTET
An enduring principle of corporate governance is that a board of
directors is obligated by two distinct duties toward the firm’s shareholders.
The first obligation is the duty of care. This duty requires a board to manage
the affairs of the organization for the benefit of its shareholders.80 A board
member should act in good faith and as a reasonable person would under
similar circumstances in order to advance the best interests of the
corporation.81 The second obligation is the duty of loyalty, the obligation
currently of most relevance to this manuscript, 82 which requires a board
member place the interests of the corporation over his or her own interests
in making decisions on behalf of the company.83
79. Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61, 74
(2011). Cf. William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractarians, Community, and the Tort of
Interference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1109 n.16 (1996) (discussing how lawyers
advise clients with a legal mix that supports proposed courses of action).
80. Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap Between Ownership and Control, 34 J. CORP.
L. 409, 414 (2009).
81. Id. See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (listing standards
of conduct for directors).
82. The Caremark claim, the subject of this manuscript, was originally based on a breach
of a board’s duty of care. Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to Monitor Risk After Citigroup,
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153, 1156 n.24 (2010). However, the Delaware Supreme Court arguably
“ripped the Caremark claim from its original home in the duty of care and reinvented it as a
duty of loyalty.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J.
CORP. L. 967, 975 (2009). This change appears to arise from Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d
492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003), in which the court stated:
Although the Caremark decision is rightly seen as a prod towards the greater
exercise of care by directors in monitoring their corporations’ compliance with
legal standards, by its plain and intentional terms, the opinion articulates a
standard for liability for failures of oversight that requires a showing that the
directors breached their duty of loyalty by failing to attend to their duties in good
faith.
Id.
83. See, e.g., Lawrence Scheinert, Hewlett-Packard’s Spy Games and the “Duty of
Caremark”: How Inconsistent Standards Governing a Director’s Duty of Care Disgraced a
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Since the court’s 1963 ruling in Graham v. Allis-Chambers
Manufacturing Co., a board did not breach its obligations to shareholders
unless the board encountered clear and present warnings signs suggesting
illegal conduct.84 However, in many industries such warning signs rarely
reached the board of directors.85 In order to balance the opposing interests
of the need to respond to legality and the limited capacity of the board to
seek out very possibility of wrongdoing, the court in Caremark required
boards to make at least a good faith attempt to ensure that an adequate
information and reporting system exists in the organization.86 The failure to
do so could render a board liable for losses from the improper conduct that
arises from that failure to monitor.87 Thus, the board maintains an obligation
to ensure a monitoring and reporting system exist that can prevent illegality,
but does not require the board to affirmatively root out specific instances of
non-compliance in the organization.
Caremark kept shareholder claims on a tight leash. As the court
explained in its now oft-quoted opinion, “only a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.” 88
The court made clear that its test held plaintiffs to a “quite high” standard
that is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a
plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” 89 Such a difficult test was intended
to stimulate good faith efforts by directors, but not be so burdensome that it
deterred qualified individuals from serving on boards.90
In the intervening years, Caremark claims were frequently
unsuccessful, and such claims rarely survived long enough to impose
liability on a director.91 One Delaware court even derided “the parade of
Company, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 454 (2007) (briefly explaining this principle).
84. Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 2135, 2158 (2019).
85. Id.
86. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 971.
89. Id. at 967, 971.
90. See id. at 971.
91. Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 17 (2013)
(“Chancellor Allen established a heightened standard of care in Caremark while suggesting
that it would very rarely, if ever, result in personal liability.”); Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S.
Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1643 (2018) (noting
that “Caremark claims rarely succeed”). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and
Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 990 (2009) (stating that claims alleging
failures in risk management rarely result in liability).
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hastily filed Caremark complaints that Delaware courts have dismissed.”92
The pathway for imposing liability seemed quite narrow, and continued to
be so, until a recent Delaware Supreme Court case, followed in close
succession by the governance quartet raised the possibility of a broader or
more flexible view of Caremark and its associated duties to shareholders.
A. Marchand v. Barnhill
In 2015, Blue Bell Creameries, a major ice cream manufacturer,
suffered an outbreak of listeria. 93 The specific type of listeria species,
listeria monocytogenes, is one of the most virulent human pathogens and can
be especially dangerous for developing fetuses and immune-compromised
individuals.94 Over twenty percent of individuals who develop listeriosis as
a result of a listeria infection die as a result.95 Like other listeria outbreaks,96
this outbreak had serious and fatal consequences. Three customers died and
ten customers were hospitalized from listeria monocytogenes traced to
consumption of Blue Bell ice cream.97 In addition, shareholders suffered
losses arising from the operational shutdown associated with the listeria
outbreak.98 The company was also forced to accept a dilutive private equity
investment as a result of a liquidity crisis.99 As a result, a stock holder sued
two executives and members of the board of directors, alleging that they
breached their duties of loyalty and care by failing to oversee Blue Bell’s
operations and disregarding risks of contamination of Blue Bell’s ice
cream.100
The Caremark claim was filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery.101
After reviewing the facts and the relevant legal landscape, the court

92. In re China Agritech, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL
2181514, at *40 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2013). See also Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk,
39 J. CORP. L. 253, 281 (2014) (citing case for the principle that successful Caremark facts
“are not easily alleged.”).
93. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 807 (Del. 2019).
94. Kim Bosquet, A Meticulous Food Safety Plan Today Avoids Handcuffs Tomorrow,
14 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 271, 278 (2018).
95. Id.
96. Id. (noting that “the deadliest foodborne illness outbreak in the U.S. since the early
1900s” was an outbreak of listeria monocytogenes that resulted in thirty-three deaths and 150
illnesses).
97. Parks & Cardinal, supra note 6, at 341–42.
98. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 807.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159, at *16 (Del. Ch. Sept.
27, 2018).
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evaluated the plaintiff’s Caremark claims.102 The court stated that in order
to prove a Caremark claim, the plaintiff had to show either “(1) the directors
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls;
or (2) having implemented such a system or controls, the directors
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.” 103 Evaluating the first prong, the court noted that plaintiff
described the “intense regulatory scrutiny” under which Blue Bell operated
and the internal systems and controls it had in place for detecting and
reporting unsanitary conditions.104 However, the trial court noted that no
allegation was made showing that such controls were not implemented.105 In
responding to plaintiff’s allegation that the board utterly failed in its
oversight duty because it “had no audit or other supervisory structure”
responsible for relevant controls, the court stated that no authority exists
requiring directors to create certain committees to monitor and manage
business risks, especially when evidence showed that risk management
measures had been taken in Blue Bell’s operations. 106 The court then
characterized plaintiff’s claim as a challenge to effectiveness of controls, not
the existence of controls, and concluded that such a challenge is not a basis
for first prong Caremark liability.107
Finding itself unable to determine whether or not plaintiff intended to
advance a second-prong argument, court quickly rejected plaintiff’s second
prong claim.108 The court characterized plaintiff’s arguments as Blue Bell
could have anticipated the listeria crisis had the company possessed proper
oversight.109 The court stated this argument is not a Caremark claim and
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.110
The plaintiff appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, which took care
to state that it was not examining the effectiveness of a board-level
compliance and reporting system, but rather whether a reasonable inference
exists that the board failed to make good faith efforts to implement a system
of monitoring and reporting.111 The court then presented a laundry list of
allegations that Blue Bell lacked a monitoring and reporting infrastructure
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *17.
Id.
Id. at *18 (quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at *18–19.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *20.
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019).
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related to food safety compliance, practices, risks, or reports.112 The board
had no dedicated food safety committee, no process for regular reporting by
management on food safety, and no schedule for the board to regularly
consider food safety. 113 In addition, the board received only limited
information about deficiencies in Blue Bell’s plants from management and
did not appear to have regular discussions about food safety in its
meetings.114 Such deficiencies in plant operations, the court recounted from
plaintiff’s complaint, could have been rectified if a reasonable reporting
system to the board had been in place.115
The court stated the Blue Bell’s nominal compliance with FDA
regulations did not necessarily imply that it had a “system to monitor food
safety at the board level.”116 The court concluded: “The mundane reality that
Blue Bell is in a highly regulated industry and complied with some of the
applicable regulations does not foreclose any pleading-stage inference that
the directors’ lack of attentiveness rose to the level of bad faith indifference
required to state a Caremark claim.” 117 The board’s mere discussion of
general operations was not enough to thwart a Caremark claim, for if the
court let this be sufficient, “Caremark would be a chimera.”118 The court
reversed the trial court’s decision and allowed plaintiff’s Caremark claims
to proceed.119
B. Ignoring Systemic Wrongdoing: In re Clovis Oncology, Inc.,
Derivative Litigation and Hughes v. Hu
Less than three months after the Delaware Supreme Court decided
Marchand, the Court of Chancery decided the Clovis case. Clovis involved
a pharmaceutical company that had a promising and potentially lucrative
drug at the early stages of clinical trials.120 This drug, Rociletinib or ‘Roci’,
would be a direct competitor to rival firm AstraZeneca, which was also
racing to develop its own promising and lucrative drug targeted at the same
market.121 If Clovis could get the drug approved by the FDA, and bring it to
112. Id. at 822.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 823 (emphasis in original).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 824.
119. Id.
120. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL
4850188, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
121. Id. at *4.
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market quickly, it would have a significant influence on the company’s
financial fortunes.122
FDA approval requires proof of safety and efficacy in clinical trials.
Clovis and the FDA agreed that the company would use for the clinical trial
a well-established protocol known as RECIST. 123 A key metric for the
drug’s success in the clinical trial is the objective response rate (ORR), which
measures the percentage of patients who experience a meaningful benefit as
a result of the drug.124 The board was “laser-focused” on the drugs ORR
because it was an important measure for both the FDA and investors, upon
whose capital Clovis entirely relied upon for funding.125
Problems began when the board of directors learned that Clovis was
improperly calculating Roci’s ORR as more successful than it really was.126
Inaccurately optimistic clinical trial results were reported to the public,
investors, securities analysts, and the FDA over a significant period of
time. 127 Evidence of Clovis’s failure to follow RECIST and reports of
inflated ORRs repeatedly reached the board of directors, and the board did
not take any concrete action in response. As the trial court remarked, “[w]ith
hands on their ears to muffle the alarms,” the board signed and approved
Clovis’ 2014 annual report which contained the aforementioned misleading
statements.128 The charade continued until late 2015, when the public was
finally informed of Roci’s true and much-lower ORR than previously stated,
and the firm’s stock price immediately dropped seventy percent, wiping out
one billion in capital as a result.129
Clovis shareholders sued the company, alleging in part a Caremark
claim that the board failed to institute an oversight system for the clinical
trial and consciously ignored with a series of red flags regarding those
trials. 130 Citing the presence of a nominating and corporate governance
board committees, and extensive reviews of the clinical trial at each board
meeting, the court concluded that plaintiffs did not show sufficient evidence
of a lack of reporting or information system controls to sustain a Caremark
claim.131
The court, however, did find evidence sufficient to support the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *13.
Id.
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Caremark claim that the board failed to monitor its oversight system. The
board was fully aware that management was misstating clinical trial results
and not following required protocols.132 The board was comprised of experts
in the pharmaceutical industry that understood the consequences of Clovis’s
actions.133 The court concluded that it was “satisfied they have well-pled that
the Board consciously ignored red flags that revealed a mission critical
failure to comply with the RECIST protocol and associated FDA
regulations.”134 The court then denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the
Caremark claim and allowed that claim to proceed.135
Coupled with Marchand, the Clovis decision received attention about
whether it portended a potential new trend for Caremark litigants.136 Six
months later another Caremark claimant survived a motion to dismiss in a
case that again emphasized the court’s concern about directors muffling their
ears toward systemic wrongdoing within the company.137 Unlike the specific
instance of inaccurate calculation of Roci’s ORR that should have raised an
alarm in Clovis, 138 the shareholders in Hughes v. Hu sued based on
“persistent problems with the Company’s system of financial oversight over
a prolonged period”139 that resulted in harm to the organization.
The company at issue in Hughes, Kandi Technologies Group, was
based in China but became a Delaware public company in 2007 through a
reverse merger of a still publicly listed but defunct company.140 Kandi sold
parts to a joint venture in which it has fifty percent ownership to manufacture
electric vehicles.141 The electric vehicles are then sold to a third company in
which Kandi has less than a ten percent ownership interest and this third
company then sells and leases the electric vehicles.142
A 2010 audit of the company revealed “key audit risks” and a “key

132. Id.
133. Id. at *14.
134. Id. at *15.
135. Id.
136. See Robert C. Bird, Caremark Compliance for the Next Twenty-Five Years, 58 AM.
BUS. L.J. 63 (2021) (discussing the evolution of Caremark cases). See also John Jenkins,
Something’s Happening Here: Caremark Bites Another Board, DEAL LAWYERS (Oct. 2,
2019), https://www.deallawyers.com/blog/2019/10/somethings-happening-here-caremarkbites-another-board.html [https://perma.cc/TUT2-5SKR] (“Is Caremark becoming a more
viable theory of liability, or is board’s conduct in these cases just more egregious than in prior
cases?”).
137. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
138. Clovis Oncology, Inc., 2019 WL 4850188, at *7.
139. Hughes, 2020 WL 1987029, at *13.
140. Id. at *2.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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control weakness” for related-party transactions. 143 The audit further
identified, although did not address it as a key control weakness, that several
of the employees of the company, including its CEO Hu, held large sums of
the company’s cash resources in personal bank accounts.144 Audit reports
for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 continued to raise issues about the
financial controls and processes of the company that remained unaddressed
and instead often showed repeated occurrences of risky practices concerning
related-party transactions raised in the 2010 audit. 145 All the more
remarkable, the auditing firm reporting these concerns was not independent
of Kandi Technologies Group, as it had no other clients than the company.146
In March 2014, the company again reported a material weakness in its
financial reporting, including lack of oversight by the audit committee and
inadequate policies regarding related-party transactions.147
Despite the serious nature of the lack of financial controls and
procedures and a pledge by the company to address the numerous
inadequacies, the audit committee did not meet again for two months. 148
Two May meetings were intended to review related-party transaction
policies but lasted less than an hour and the company could not produce
reports from the meetings.149 This pattern of few audit committees, lack of
financial controls, and no oversight continued with the only tangible action
taken by the board was approval to fire their auditing firm.150 Ultimately, in
March 2017 the company announced that its financial statements between
2014 and 2016 were unreliable and that the financial reports would be
restated.151 During the relevant time period, Kandi Technologies Group had
three people serve as the Chief Financial Officer. 152 Three directors
participated on the audit committee along with CEO Hu over the relevant
time period when audits reported major financial inadequacies.153
In denying the motion to dismiss the court found the shareholders
allegations supported an inference that the audit committee “met
sporadically, devoted inadequate time to its work, had clear notice of

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *6–8.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *9.
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irregularities and consciously turned a blind eye to their continuation.”154
Instead, the audit committee relied on management for reports, policies and
procedures, and hiring and firing the external auditors.155 Despite having the
structure of oversight, no true oversight was demonstrated by board members
on the audit committee or non-audit committee board members. 156 The
directors themselves, particularly those on the audit committee, lacked the
expertise necessary to perform the oversight function that was their
obligation157
The Clovis court chastised directors muffling their ears while alarms
were raised and the Hughes court similarly rebuked directors for turning a
blind eye when serious and systemic company wrongdoing should have
triggered closer examination of financial processes. In Clovis, the court
noted that the directors’ expertise in the pharmaceutical industry meant they
knew the consequences of these actions while in Hughes, the directors lacked
the skills and independence to perform the oversight function adequately. In
each case, the companies failed the standard of oversight demanded in
Caremark and Marchand.
C. Critical Information Flows: Teamsters Local 443 Health Services &
Insurance Plan v. Chou and Inter-Marketing Grp. USA, Inc. v.
Armstrong
Two Caremark claims survived motions to dismiss in addition to
Hughes in 2020. Both claims echo the Marchand court’s focus on
compliance in highly regulated industries at the board level.158 These cases
154. Id. at *14
155. Id.
156. Id. at *15. See also In re McKesson Corporation Derivative Litig., Case No. 17-cv01850-CW, 2018 WL 2197548, at *23 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) (“Defendants claim that
they were simply ignorant of what was happening with the company because they were
constantly reassured that if any problems existed, they were being addressed. At this stage,
however, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged sufficient factual allegations constituting multiple
‘red flags’ that Defendants ignored.”).
157. Hughes, 2020 WL 1987029, at *15
The directors charged with implementing a system to oversee the Company’s
financial reporting thus lacked the expertise necessary to do so all along. Instead,
the Audit Committee deferred to management, which dictated the policies and
procedures for reviewing related-party transactions and hired and fired the
Company’s auditor, even though management’s actions suggested that it was
either incapable of accurately reporting on related-party transactions or actively
evading board-level oversight.
158. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 823 (Del. 2019) (addressing compliance in
context of a highly regulated industry).
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demonstrate that failure to address known compliance deficits can rise to the
level of bad faith that will permit a Caremark claim to survive. In Teamsters
Local 443 Health Services & Insurance Plan v. Chou,159 the court focused
on the mission critical compliance addressed in Marchand.160 Shareholders
of AmerisourceBergen Corporation (“ABC”) sued alleging that ABC’s
board failed to oversee a division of its operations that resulted in criminal
and civil liability. In analyzing the claim the court noted that the purpose of
the corporation was to manufacture, distribute, and package pharmaceutical
drugs. Therefore ABC, like Blue Bell and Clovis, operated in a highly
regulated industry.161 When operating in such an environment the mission is
intrinsically connected to legal compliance. Thus, “flouting laws meant to
ensure the safety and purity of drugs destined for patients suffering from
cancer is directly inimical to the central purpose of ABC’s business.” 162
Although ABC is a significantly more complex operation than either Blue
Bell or the biopharmaceutical firm Clovis, that does not relieve the board of
diligent oversight, but rather makes the oversight all the more central to
board responsibilities.163
ABC acquired Oncology Supply Pharmacy Services (“Pharmacy”) as
part of a larger merger in 2001. The business of Pharmacy was to buy single
dose vials of oncology drugs, fill a syringe, and then sell that syringe to
cancer patients for injection. 164 The vials that Pharmacy acquired
intentionally had “overfill,” meaning there was additional medication than
required for a single injection to account for human error and to allow
discharge to remove air bubbles.165 The extra amount of medication is not
meant for use, but Pharmacy illegally aggregated the extra amounts and used
it to fill additional syringes. 166 This resulted in contamination of the
aggregated drugs.167 This illegal practice was uncovered and resulted in
ABC criminal and civil liability.
Should directors be responsible for the criminal enterprise in one
subsidiary of a large and complex operation? The court opined on the
Caremark claim:
It is true that directors are not omniscient, that their eyes cannot be

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

C.A. No. 2019-0816-SG, 2020 WL 5028065 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020).
See infra Part III.D.
Chou, 2020 WL 5028065 at *18.
Id.
Id. at *3–4
Id. at *4.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
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on every sparrow, and that not every failure of oversight is the
result of bad faith. Here, however, ABC operated a criminal
enterprise. The directors ignored such red flags as did exist, and,
in addition, permitted a woefully inadequate reporting system with
respect to the business line in which Pharmacy operated.168
The major red flag relied on by the court for Caremark claim analysis
was a qui tam action filed against ABC by Michael Mullen, the former COO
of the division responsible for Pharmacy and a member of ABC’s Corporate
Ethics Committee. 169 When Mullen identified significant business issues
within his division, which included Pharmacy, he formulated strategic
initiatives to address the issues and alerted board level management.170 After
several months of raising safety and regulatory compliance issues, Mullen
was fired.171 He then filed a qui tam complaint alleging that the overfill
program acted as a kickback scheme and price concession to physician
customers.172 Although ABC’s counsel became aware of the complaint, he
did not disclose the complaint to the board directly. 173 However, the
complaint was disclosed in ABC’s Form 10-K filed with the SEC in 2010
and 2011.174 These filings were signed by the members of the board.175
The court found that failure to address the issues raised by the qui tam
action, require reports and updates on implementation of compliance
initiatives, or take other actions concerning the syringe-filling program infers
bad faith by the board and potential Caremark liability. 176 Management
learned about the qui tam action and terminated a high-level employee
without a system that required such critical information to flow to the
directors.177 Furthermore, the board offered only cursory references to the
compliance issue while the court expected “a tangible reaction to—as
opposed to a review of—the mission critical compliance failures at
Pharmacy.”178
The fourth of the post-Marchand cases to survive a motion to dismiss
is Inter-Marketing Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong. 179 Similar to Chou,

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *25.
C.A. No. 2017-0030-TMR, 2020 WL 756965 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (concerning a
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adequate information flow to the board from operations so that directors can
take action on compliance failures is a central focus of this decision. Plains
All American Pipeline’s sole business was owning and maintaining pipelines
throughout North America. 180 In 2015 one of these pipelines located in
California ruptured, spilling 3,400 barrels of oil in the Pacific Ocean and in
environmentally sensitive areas along the coast.181 The spill was caused by
pipe corrosion. 182 The clean-up efforts alone cost the company $257
million.183 Later, the company was found criminally liable for its pipeline
maintenance.184
In a breach of contract claim, the court employed Caremark analysis.185
Similar to Blue Bell’s failure to implement director level oversight of
consumer safety and legal compliance, the board of Plains failed to
implement a system of pipeline integrity and management oversight. 186
Rather, the record showed that the decision to investigate problematic
pipelines was made, “probably three or four, maybe five or six levels down”
from top management. 187 Safety issues related to the pipelines were not
discussed at the board level.188 What the board received about the pipelines
were “activity-level” reports that detailed projections for the year relative to
actual pipeline activity.189 These amounted to graphs “devoid of substance”
and did not demonstrate that the board “ever considered pipeline integrity
variances or that the explanations contained more substantive information
than the general activity-level reports.”190 Given that the one purpose of the
company was to maintain pipelines, this lack of detailed information about
how well the pipes were maintained did not meet the oversight obligation of
the company’s directors.191
Similar to compliance risks ignored by directors in Marchand and the
other post-Marchand decisions surviving the motion to discuss, delegating
Delaware general partnership but utilizing Delaware corporate law analysis).
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id. at *3.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *10 (“This opinion does not rule that a general partner’s contractual requirement
to act in ‘the best interests of the [p]artnership’ imposes duties identical to those identified in
Caremark. Nonetheless, this opinion does as the parties have and analyzes these contract
based oversight liability claims using Caremark’s established framework.”).
186. Id. at *13.
187. Id. at *12.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *14.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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oversight for compliance to an audit committee does not create a system for
adequate disposal of oversight. Although the board of Plains delegated to an
audit committee responsibility for overseeing legal and compliance issues,
no reports indicated the committee performed pipeline integrity reviews,
which was the board’s central compliance risk.192
As individual cases, Marchand and the governance quartet decisions
are significant in their own right because they are rare examples of Caremark
claimants surviving a motion to dismiss. These cases also offer opportunities
to evaluate and revisit the nature and scope of Caremark claims as the
Caremark case reaches its twenty-fifth year as a seminal case in corporate
governance.193 Most importantly for purpose of this manuscript, however,
these decisions present evidence of a fundamental shift toward a way of
thinking about the monitoring and reporting systems of organizations that
ensure compliance with relevant laws and policies. This shift in thinking
toward a systems understanding of corporate governance represents a new
paradigm in perceiving how compliance programs are expected to function
in organizations. This paradigm did not emerge overnight, and the next Part
explores how courts incorporated systems thinking, and not just gatekeeping,
in their decisions about corporate governance.
III. FROM GATEKEEPING DISCOURSE TO SYSTEMS THINKING IN
CAREMARK CLAIMS
The incorporation of systems thinking into the Marchand and
governance quartet cases did not happen overnight. This perspective is the
result of a long evolution of Delaware cases that date back to the original
Caremark decision in 1996. 194 This Part highlights a gradual shift in
Caremark cases from a reliance on gatekeeping unworthy plaintiffs who
merely challenge the effectiveness, and not the existence, of compliance
controls, toward an emphasis on perceiving compliance as a holistic system
with attendant responsibilities for the board of directors. Section A
chronicles the decline of gatekeeping discourse. Section B shows the subtle
development and recognition of systems thinking, and its associated broader
liability for board members, under more recent Caremark claims.

192. Id. at *13.
193. See generally Bird, supra note 136 (discussing the evolution of Caremark cases).
194. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). See also
Paul E. McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 647, 66877 (2018) (tracing the evolution of Caremark claims from a compliance perspective since
1996).
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A. The Decline of Gatekeeping Discourse
Caremark claims have a high burden of proof. Proving that a board of
directors failed in a sustained or systemic fashion to exercise oversight over
a firm’s monitoring system requires a veritable mountain of evidence. With
Caremark claims a not infrequent occurrence in Delaware courts, the motion
to dismiss phase of litigation serves as an important gatekeeping function
that keeps most Caremark claims from going to trial. 195 By placing the
burden on plaintiffs to plead plausibly and with precision at the initial stages
of litigation, the weakest claims are filtered out. 196 Courts keep judicial
workload in check and defendants remain unburdened from costly discovery
and summary judgment motions arising from unmeritorious litigation.197
The motion to dismiss has played an influential role in Caremark
litigation, with failed Caremark claims creating a veritable graveyard of
unfavorable precedent. Reviewing the guiding language of Caremark cases
in isolation and acknowledging the high failure rate of Caremark-based
litigants, it would be reasonable to conclude that courts have all but
“slammed the door shut” on future litigation.198 Reinforcing this notion yet
further is that barrier-setting Caremark language has been repeatedly relied
upon by Caremark courts. Over 187 court cases over a twenty-plus year
period have noted that Caremark is notable for being one of, if not the most,
difficult theories of proof in corporate law. 199 Furthermore, over 200
secondary sources have similarly acknowledged that Caremark liability is
exceedingly difficult to establish.200
That does not necessarily mean, however, that Caremark’s prohibitory

195. Cf. Michael Daly Hawkins & Matthew J. Stanford, Uproot or Upgrade? Revisiting
Section 230 Immunity in the Digital Age, 06/23/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (explaining
that motions to dismiss serve a gatekeeping function in civil litigation). For a general
discussion of gatekeeping in the corporate context, see Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP.
L. 735 (2004).
196. Hawkins & Stanford, supra note 195, at 5.
197. Hawkins & Stanford, supra note 195, at 5–6.
198. See MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D&O LIABILITY HANDBOOK, THE
TRADITIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK—THE OVERSIGHT CASES § I:7 (2020).
199. A Westlaw search for “Caremark”/p (“most difficult” or “among the hardest”) in the
“Cases” database on December 2, 2020 yielded 187 cases. This search is the same as one
conducted in Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 682 n.3 (2018),
which yielded 155 cases. The seminal statement of this concept is unsurprisingly found in In
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 968 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that an
oversight claim “is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff
might hope to win a judgment”).
200. A Westlaw search for “Caremark”/p (“most difficult” or “among the hardest”) in the
“Secondary Sources” database on December 2, 2020 yielded 215 examples.
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language will always retain the same influence that it did in 1996. Although
guiding language established by an earlier court can remain intact, the
influence of that language and the interpretive gloss it is given by later courts
can change over time.201 Conversely, ostensibly rigorous judicial language
can be so eroded that its interpretation remains a mere shadow of its plain
meaning.202
Similarly, evidence now suggests that an interpretive drift is occurring
in Caremark claims. Comparing the original Caremark case to its recent
progeny highlights its changing influence. The 1996 Caremark case went to
great lengths to keep the barriers facing shareholder-plaintiffs high,
constraining a viable claim to only the “utter failure to attempt” to ensure a
reasonable reporting system.203 The court called this a “demanding test” and
a theory that “is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”204 Viewing this language
in isolation could leave one to wonder why the Caremark court bothered to
open the door to liability at all.

201. Perhaps the most famous example of such an evolution is constitutional law scholar
Gerald Gunther’s interpretation of the phrase ‘strict scrutiny’. Gunther argued that, although
the courts applying strict scrutiny were ostensibly giving elevated review to certain
legislation, what was really happening was that the determination that the strict scrutiny
standard applied inevitably meant that the legislation would be struck down as
unconstitutional. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). For an empirical perspective, see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 793, 795–96 (2006) (studying all strict scrutiny cases between 1990 and 2003 in federal
courts and concluding that, “strict scrutiny is far from the inevitably deadly test imagined by
the Gunther myth and more closely resembles the context-sensitive tool described by [Justice]
O’Connor”).
202. Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Congress may regulate if
the subject has a “substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Yet in spite of the use of the word “substantial,” courts are highly
deferential to the actions of Congress in regulating commercial activities. In the context of
eminent domain, government agencies may only seize privately-owned land when it is
“necessary” to further a public use but courts have interpreted the word “necessary” so loosely
that virtually any proffered interest by the government constitutes sufficient necessity to seize
private land. Robert C. Bird, Reviving Necessity in Eminent Domain, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 239, 243–46 (2010).
203. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Such
a test of liability—lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or systemic failure of a director
to exercise reasonable oversight—is quite high.”); id. (“[O]nly a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish the lack of good faith that
is a necessary condition to liability.”).
204. Id. at 967, 971.
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Viewing the same Delaware court system interpreting the same claim
over two decades later, however, reveals a cognizable turn away from this
prohibitive language. Instead of having a dominant influence on the court’s
analysis, the Marchand court relegated the “utter failure” concept to single
unanchored quotation in the text and two references in the footnotes.205 None
of these references seemed to drive the court’s thinking in any significant
way. Similarly, the oft-quoted notion that a Caremark claim was the “most
difficult theory in corporation law” received only parenthetical attention in a
single footnote. 206 The court cited this language for the proposition that
“Caremark claims are difficult to plead and ultimately to prove out.” 207
Finally, whereas Caremark made clear that it offered a “demanding test” for
liability,208 that language was not relied upon in Marchand. Although not a
wholesale rejection of Caremark constraints, it arguably represents a step
down from being the “most difficult theory in corporation law” to one that is
merely challenging to plead and prove.209 Intriguingly, the Marchand court
did not go out of its way to emphasize Caremark’s narrow opening for
liability, a prominent theme in the original Caremark case.
Some deemphasis of Caremark’s gatekeeping language is also arguably
present in Clovis. The Clovis opinion was written by a trial judge and not
the supreme court, and mindful of its obligations to stare decisis, it not
surprising to see Clovis hewing closer to prior precedent than Marchand.
Clovis did not note that the Caremark claim was a “demanding test” for
liability. Clovis twice stated that a plaintiff must show that the directors
“completely fail[ed] to implement” a system or controls for one prong of a
Caremark claim,210 but did not mention the “utter failure” language.211 The
reminder that Caremark was “the most difficult theory” to plead and prove
was cited for the proposition that “a Caremark claim is among the hardest to
plead and prove.”212
Similar deemphasis is present in the Caremark claims surviving motion
to dismiss after Clovis. These subsequent cases do not describe Caremark
as a “demanding test” but characterize it more as a necessary check on
directors that fail in necessary oversight. For instance, in Chou the court
acknowledges that Caremark liability is rarely imposed but does not credit

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809, 821 n.104, 822 n.106 (Del. 2019).
Id. at 820 n.99.
Id. at 820.
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
Marchand, 212 A.3d at 820; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *12–13.
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *12.
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the difficulty of the standard but rather that “it is fortunately rare that
directors, otherwise unconflicted, should nonetheless take actions knowingly
inimical to the corporate interest, such as ignoring a known duty to act to
prevent the corporation from violating positive law.” 213 The Hughes court
described Caremark liability “conceptualized as flowing from an
overarching failure by the directors to take the action necessary to protect the
corporation.” 214 These subsequent cases take their cue from the earlier
judicial signaling in Marchand.
In spite of the presence of gatekeeping language, the courts found in all
these cases that the plaintiffs met the pleading burden and allowed the claims
to survive a motion to dismiss. Both courts and commentators have noted
that Caremark claims rarely succeed,215 and thus the survival of this claim in
four cases in less than twelve months following the Marchand decision is
significant.
The “utter failure” language and other admonitions like it will not
simply vanish from the Caremark lexicon. However, there appears to be a
perceptible deemphasis of the gatekeeping language that makes Caremark
claims so difficult to plead and prove. When judicial language appears to be
mentioned only in passing, rather than a keystone of the standard to be
applied, that language will lose its influential power.
If Caremark’s gatekeeping language may have been relaxed, as
Marchand and the governance quartet appear to indicate, the question
remains of what evidence might fill the vacuum. Not only has there been a
shift away from narrowly allowing Caremark claims, but there has been a
meaningful rise in systems thinking when evaluating whether the board has
met its duty of care.216 The next section highlights how systems thinking is
playing an emergent historical role in Caremark cases.

213. Teamsters Local 443 Health Svcs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, C.A. No. 2019-0816-SG,
2020 WL 5028065, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020).
214. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *13 (Del. Ch. Apr.
27, 2020).
215. See, e.g., In re China Agritech, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 7163-VCL,
2013 WL 2181514, at *20 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2013) (skeptically referring to Caremark
oversight claims as a “parade of hastily filed Caremark complaints that Delaware courts have
dismissed” and that there are “rare Caremark complaints that prior decisions have found
adequate”); Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1643 (2018) (noting that “Caremark claims rarely succeed”); Elizabeth
Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2042 (2019)
(stating that Caremark claims have a “rare path of survival”).
216. See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (“If Caremark means anything, it is that a corporate
board must make a good faith effort to exercise its duty of care. A failure to make that effort
constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty.”).
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B. The Recognition and Development of Systems in Firms
While the apparent relaxation in Caremark claims appears to be
relatively recent, the use of systems and systems thinking has a long and
evolving history. Systems thinking began over fifty years ago with Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers,217 a 1963 Delaware Supreme Court decision that was the
then seminal case in corporate governance about the directorial duty to
monitor for illegal acts by subordinates.218 In Graham, senior management
became embroiled in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of antitrust law,
resulting in fines and penalties for the firm.219 Prior to Graham, there were
no cases that challenged a board’s failure to act to monitor whether
management was engaging in misconduct. 220 Instead, they involved
affirmative decisions made by the board.221 Graham held that “absent cause
for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a
corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no
reason to suspect exists.”222 Graham also remarked, “directors are entitled
to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something
occurs to put them on suspicion that something is wrong.”223
A few points are notable from Graham’s language. Graham does not
entirely bar claims against directors, but rather notes that the duty to monitor
may exist if a “cause for suspicion” exists to do so. 224 This is reflected in
modern cases by requiring shareholder plaintiffs to show some failure of the
board to respond to warning signs of misconduct in order to survive a motion
to dismiss. A “corporate system of espionage” invokes, although with
gentler language, the concept of the monitoring function in a company.225
Furthermore, underlying both holdings is the concept of a system.
Graham anticipates that when a cause for suspicion arises, boards must take
action through a system of monitoring. Perhaps Graham only contemplated
monitoring systems when problems appeared, but today such systems are

217. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
218. See Gregory S. Rowland, Earnings Management, The SEC, and Corporate
Governance: Director Liability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 168, 195 n.114 (2002) (referring to Graham as a seminal case); Primo Fontana, CERCLA
Derivative Suits, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 741, 746 (2000) (same).
219. Graham, 188 A.2d 125, 129– 30 (Del. 1963).
220. Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s
Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 149 (2015).
221. Id. at 149.
222. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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ubiquitous in most modern organizations in the form of compliance
programs. Whether inadvertently or by design, Graham set the stage for
more mature discussions of systems in duty of oversight cases.
When Caremark was decided twenty-three years later, the court
confronted the systems-related holding. The court asked itself whether
Graham would have tolerated an interpretation that corporate directors have
no duty “to assure that a corporate information gathering and reporting
systems exists which represents a good faith attempt to provide senior
management and the Board with information respecting material acts, events
or conditions within the corporation, including compliance with applicable
statutes and regulations?”226 The court “certainly [did] not believe so” and
doubted that such a “broad generalization of the Graham holding would have
been accepted by the Supreme Court in 1963.”227 After reviewing Graham
and later cases, the Caremark explicitly refuted such an anti-systems idea,
stating that it would be a “mistake to conclude that . . . Graham[’s statement]
concerning ‘espionage’ means that corporate boards may satisfy their
obligation to be reasonably informed . . . without assuring themselves that
information and reporting systems exist in the organization” that provide
timely and accurate information to the board of directors.228 Caremark was
thus written explicitly with systems of reporting and monitoring in mind,
leaving the door open for future courts to further rely on systems language
in evaluating boards’ obligations to the organization.
This perspective carried forward to Marchand and the governance
quartet. All five of the cases rejected the notion that ad-hoc compliance, the
antithesis of systemic thinking, would be sufficient to withstand a Caremark
claim against the board. For example, the company in Marchand argued that
it conformed to FDA regulations in its food safety practices.229 However, the
court cited that such conformance does not necessarily infer that the board

226. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
227. Id. at 969.
228. Id. at 970. The court’s full statement, essentially a single run-on sentence, was:
[I]t would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude that our Supreme Court’s
statement in Graham concerning “espionage” means that corporate boards may
satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation,
without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the
organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and
to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management
and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning
both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.
Id. at 970.
229. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.2d 805, 823 (Del. 2019).
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actually implemented a system to monitor food safety.230 In addition, the
court said such nominal conformance does not necessarily infer that an
appropriate monitoring system engaged the board.231 Similarly, Clovis did
not accept that the mere existence of two relevant board sub-committees, the
nominating and corporate governance committee and the audit committee,
were enough to thwart a potential Caremark claim.232 In both Hughes and
Inter-Marketing Group the existence of an audit committees with
compliance obligations did not suffice to survive motions to dismiss. 233
Boards cannot expect compliance functions in isolation from one another
and not in coordination with the broader needs of the organization as
sufficient compliance to withstand Caremark liability.
Finally, and perhaps most bluntly, modern holdings have increased
their reliance on systems language. In the original Caremark case, the word
‘system’, or some derivative of it, appeared sixteen times. 234 In the
Marchand case, a shorter opinion than Caremark, ‘system’ or its derivative
appeared forty-six times.235 In the Clovis and Inter-Marketing cases, where
the Caremark claim received significantly less written attention than in
Caremark or Marchand, both still used the term fifteen times, largely for
citing language from Caremark and Marchand with approval.236 In Hughes
the word or its derivative was used twenty-seven times.237 While a single
term does not conclusively inform substance, judges do choose words
carefully and strategically in order to achieve descriptive and normative
goals. 238 The increased use of the systems concept when comparing the
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL
4850188, at *2-*3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
233. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *15 (Del. Ch. Apr.
27, 2020); Inter-Matg. Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, C.A. No. 2017-0030-TMR, 2020 WL
756965, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020).
234. This was measured by downloading a pdf of the Westlaw version of the opinion,
converting it to a Word document, and then using the search functions to count the number of
times the word “system” or its derivatives appeared in the document.
235. Marchand, 212 A.3d 805 passim (Del. 2019).
236. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL
4850188 passim (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). Twice the word “system” was used, but only to
describe the RECIST protocols in a context unrelated to the Caremark claim. Id.; Inter-Mktg.
Group, 2020 WL 756965 passim. This includes the use of the word “systematic” when
quoting from the complaint. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc., 2019 WL 4850188 at *12.
237. Hughes, 2020 WL 1987029 passim. In Chou the term was used just fourteen times
with the opinion focused on “red flag” language to determine that the board should have
demanded more information.
238. See, e.g., Rachael K. Hinkle et al., A Positive Theory and Empirical Analysis of
Strategic Word Choice in District Court Opinions, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 407, 436–40 (2012)
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Caremark and Marchand opinions is noteworthy.
C. The Increasing Expectations of Board Process and Engagement
In addition to recognizing the relevance of a system in Caremark cases,
courts have also faulted boards for lacking adequate system traits in their
information and reporting systems. Some of Marchand’s most cogent
criticisms were levied against failures of process by Blue Bell. Functioning
processes are essential for making a system work. It is through established
processes that systems receive, evaluate, and transmit information to other
parts of the system in order to achieve a particular goal.239
In Marchand, the board lacked functioning system processes that would
enable information to reach the board for consideration. First, the board
lacked a food safety committee.240 Given the nature of Blue Bell’s business,
such a committee in hindsight appears to be an obvious need to make a
compliance system work. A board subcommittee can act as a first line of
evaluation of issues before invoking the limited time and resources of the
full board of directors. This process will enable information passing through
a compliance system to reach members of the board more readily and allow
members of the board who have a specific expertise in food safety to be
dedicated to the task. In addition, the court cited as problems the lack of a
regularized process to report food safety issues to the board and for the board
to consider future food safety risks. 241 These criticisms highlight that
Marchand was not only concerned with a reactive system process to respond
to problems, but also proactive systems process to receive information about
and take action on safety risks that could become problems in the future.

(finding a statistically significant increase in the use of certain language by judges depending
on the ideological distance between district and appellate courts). The authors also present
an insightful discussion of the uses and importance of judicial text. Id. at 408–12. This does
not necessarily mean, however, that rigid interpretations of words and word counts should
dominate interpretation. For example, a reader should be cautious of when courts rely on
dictionary definitions to interpret terms, as doing so encourages using words mechanically
and in isolation. Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just
for Big Words, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14bar.
html.
239. LoPucki, supra note 58, at 583; Mingers & White, supra note 37, at 1148 (conducting
a literature review of systems thinking in operational research and management science and
finding that structure and process are fundamental to systems thinking); Linda Booth Sweeney
& John D. Sterman, Bathtub Dynamics: Initial Results of a Systems Thinking Inventory, 16
SYSTEMS DYNAMICS REV. 249, 250 (2000) (stating that system thinking skills require in part
the discovery and representation of feedback processes).
240. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.2d 805, 822 (Del. 2019).
241. Id.
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Marchand also criticized the board for lacking evidence of any
discussion of food safety issues. 242 This again is evidence of a failure of
process. Even if warning signs were being raised by employees, and
transmitted up the chain of authority by managers, this information was not
reaching the board of directors. For whatever reason, the board was unable
to realize it was being kept in the dark on critical matters of firm operations.
The absence of a functioning system and its processes contributed to the poor
oversight resulting in customer injuries and deaths. A board cannot remain
uneducated about key risks facing the organization and expect to avoid
Caremark liability.
In addition, Marchand makes clear that the board of directors must
meaningfully engage with any compliance system. No system of
information, no matter how well its processes may be, will function if the
recipients of that information cannot engage with it effectively. Attorneys
for Blue Bell argued that the plaintiff did not articulate a Caremark claim
because management discussed general operations with the board at
management’s discretion.243 For the Marchand court, that was not enough.
The court dismissed this argument, stating that “if that were the case, then
Caremark would be a chimera.” 244 Virtually any meeting between
management and the board could invoke some operational issue,245 and if
that sufficed as a compliance system then a board’s obligation to compliance
under Caremark would practically disappear. The court chided Blue Bell
for lacking a specific schedule for discussing important food safety risks.246
Similarly, the governance quartet require meaningful engagement of
the board of directors. The Clovis case highlights the fact the board appeared
unacceptably avoidant of the problems facing the organization. 247 There
appeared to be no justifiable reason why the Clovis board did not
meaningfully engage with, and make decisions on, the questionable test
results for the new drug. In Hughes, the court described the board as having
the “trappings of oversight” but noted that, like their counterparts in
Marchand they were not engaged in a reporting system.248 The ABC audit
committee “never received any reports specifically concerning compliance
at Pharmacy,” and “had no committee specifically designated to oversee
242. Id.
243. Id. at 824.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 822.
247. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL
4850188, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
248. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *16 (Del. Ch. Apr.
27, 2020).
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compliance with FDA rules and regulations.” 249 The board in InterMarketing was focused on revenue producing activity and left pipeline
maintenance to managers despite this being the major compliance risk for
the company.250 Even the best system of compliance cannot be effective if
key participants in that system fail to interact with the information that
system provides.
D. The Noteworthy Introduction of Criticality into Caremark Analyses
Finally, systems thinking invokes the concept of criticality. In the
context of systems thinking, criticality is the notion that functions can be
identified for the relative importance to the functioning of the system
overall.251 Evaluating criticality is a method of prioritizing processes and
connections within a given system based on their importance to the system’s
overall mission.252 Criticality also assesses the potential risk that a failure of
such a processes or connection would derail the mission of the
organization.253 Compliance criticality in organizations evaluates risks for
reputational damage, civil and criminal liability, and loss of consumer
confidence, amongst other risks. 254 Risks that cannot be evaluated for
criticality remain as residual risks, which firms manage with information
available.255
Marchand and its progeny expect that that boards must attend closely
to mission critical risks facing the organization.256 A mission critical risk is
249. Teamsters Local 443 Health Svcs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, C.A. No. 2019-0816-SG,
2020 WL 5028065, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020).
250. Inter-Mtg. Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, C.A. No. 2017-0030-TMR, 2020 WL
756965, at *14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020).
251. T.R. Moss & J. Woodhouse, Criticality Analysis Revisited, 15 QUALITY &
RELIABILITY ENGINEERING INT’L 117, 117 (1999).
252. Id.
253. Celia Paulsen et al., Criticality Analysis Process Model: Prioritizing Systems and
Components, NAT. INST. STDS. & TECH. iv (Apr. 2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2
018/NIST.IR.8179.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MZE-FQUK]; Moss & Woodhouse, supra note
251, at 117.
254. DELOITTE, COMPLIANCE RISK ASSESSMENTS: THE THIRD INGREDIENT IN A WORLDCLASS ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 4 (2015), available at https://www2.deloitte.com/
us/en/pages/risk/articles/compliance-risk-assessments-the-third-ingredient-in-a-world-classethics-and-compliance-program.html/ [https://perma.cc/U92E-LC3W].
255. See id. at 5 (explaining that organizations should gather employee input and existing
materials to leverage expertise to efficiently manage residual risks).
256. See, e.g., Recent Delaware Decisions Signal Renewed Focus on Board-Level
Compliance Oversight, PAUL WEISS (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.paulweiss.com/prac
tices/transactional/mergers-acquisitions/publications/recent-delaware-decisions-signal-ren
ewed-focus-on-board-level-compliance-oversight?id=30213 [https://perma.cc/KSS6-XYZ3]
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one that involves essential functions of the organization or implicates a
primary goal of the firm. A mission critical risk can derail a firm’s core
strategies and can generate serious financial losses for the enterprise. 257
Mission critical risks should warrant heightened attention by anyone whose
responsibility is relevant to that system. This, of course, includes heightened
attention by boards of directors.
Marchand speaks of “mission critical” risks in their evaluation of
Caremark claims and that language is repeated by Clovis and Chou. 258
Marchand identified food safety as a critical issue for Blue Bell’s continued
success.259 This is certainly a reasonable inference from a company that
focuses on the manufacture and sale of ice cream products. Marchand also
integrated criticality in proof requirements for Caremark claims, stating that
“[w]hen a plaintiff can plead an inference that a board has undertaken no
efforts to make sure it is informed of a compliance issue intrinsically critical
to the company’s business operation, then that supports an inference that the
board has not made the good faith effort that Caremark requires.” 260
(explaining that regulatory compliance should be considered a mission critical risk to
companies in highly regulated industries). The advisory explained:
Highly regulated industries beware. Marchand and Clovis suggest that Delaware
courts are more inclined to find Caremark liability where “a monoline company
operates in a highly regulated industry.” That is because regulatory compliance
for these companies should be considered “mission critical,” and boards in such
industries should ensure that they implement reasonable compliance policies and
programs and require periodic board level reporting on the function of such
programs and any issues identified as a result of these programs. As noted in
Clovis, this type of key regulatory risk requiring compliance with positive law
can be distinguishable from the overall package of business risks that boards
oversee and that may be more or less critical to varying degrees.
Id. See also The Risk-Intelligent Enterprise: Fundamental Steps, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
STRATEGIES NEWSL. (Nov. 2006) (characterizing mission critical risks as those that have the
“highest adverse impact on company value and strategic objectives”).
257. See Mission-Critical Systems and Why you Need Them Managed, GB TECH (Jan. 17,
2020), https://www.gbtech.net/mission-critical-systems-and-why-you-need-them-managed/
[https://perma.cc/7PNT-GK79]; Caroline McDonald, High Performance Risk Management,
RISK MGMT. MONITOR (Nov. 17, 2017) (describing a mission-critical risk as “any activity,
asset, resource, service or system that materially impacts (positively or negatively) the
organization’s ability to successfully achieve its strategic goals and objectives”), https://www
.riskmanagementmonitor.com/tag/mission-critical/ [https://perma.cc/NZ7N-LMP3].
258. See also Inter-Mtg. Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, C.A. No. 2017-0030-TMR, 2020
WL 756965, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (observing the board of directors “consciously
failing to oversee its mission-critical objective of maintaining pipeline integrity”).
259. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 2019).
260. Id. at 822 (emphasis added). The good faith effort referred to in this quotation is the
board’s obligation to conduct a “good faith effort to implement an oversight system and then
to monitor it.” Id. at 821.
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Marchand also invoked criticality in its holding, concluding “food safety
was essential and mission critical” and that the plaintiff pled sufficient facts
inferring that “no board-level system of monitoring or reporting on food
safety existed.” 261 In each of the important turning points of Marchand,
identification of facts, requirement of proof, and conclusion of law,
criticality was relied upon as a relevant factor for determining the resolution
of a Caremark claims.
The Clovis case invoked criticality thirteen times, relying significantly
on principles articulated in Marchand.262 Clovis involved reporting of trial
protocols of a single, potentially valuable drug, and Clovis reasonably found
that Roci was “intrinsically critical to the company’s business operation.”263
Clovis also relied on Marchand’s language that a board’s oversight function
is important for monitoring “mission critical” compliance risks.264 Clovis
also stated that “as Marchand makes clear, the careful observer is one whose
gaze is fixed on the company’s mission critical regulatory issues.”265 Clovis
also remarked that mission critical operations require elevated attention by
the board when compared to other issues.266 Like Marchand, Clovis also
invoked criticality when reaching legal conclusions: “Drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, I am satisfied they have well-pled that the
Board consciously ignored red flags that revealed a mission critical failure
to comply with the RECIST protocol and associated FDA regulations.”267
Embracing the concept of mission critical risk defined in the Marchand
and Clovis decisions, Chou uses the term “critical” twenty-two times in the
text and two additional times in the footnotes. 268 Similar to Clovis, the court
identified health and safety as the critical compliance risk in the
pharmaceutical industry.269 It emphasized “flouting laws meant to ensure the
safety and purity of drugs destined for patients suffering from cancer is
directly inimical to the central purpose of ABC’s business.” 270 Like
Marchand, the notion of mission critical functions raising the obligation of
boards in Caremark claims was conspicuous in its thinking.

261. Id. 824.
262. Although the court relied significantly on criticality, some of the uses of the word
“critical” were not related to evaluating the Caremark claim.
263. Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1.
264. Id. at *12 (citing Marchand 212 A.3d at 824).
265. Id. at *13.
266. Id.
267. Id. at *15.
268. Teamsters Local 443 Health Svcs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, C.A. No. 2019-0816-SG,
2020 WL 5028065 passim (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020).
269. Id. at *18
270. Id.
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E. Corporate Governance Vexillology: Flags as System Outputs for the
Board
Boards need to be aware of not only that mission critical risks that
demand elevated attention, but, in the wake of Marchand and the governance
quartet, must also be able to perceive direct or indirect warning signs that
something is amiss in the organization. In systems language, these warning
signs comprise feedback outputs from a functioning system. Identifying and
understanding feedback is necessary for keeping a system effective.271 In
organizations, a system provides feedback to system stakeholders. 272
Stakeholders then receive the system output, integrate their own information,
and resubmit that information back into the system. The result is a selfreinforcing “feedback loop,” by which users receive output from a system
and combined with their own information submit more detailed inputs back
into the system, resulting in a more effective system overall. 273
Courts evaluating Caremark claims expect boards to obtain feedback
from the organization, assess it properly, and respond with instructions that
disseminate through the enterprise. In systems language, boards must be
able to receive system outputs, identify such outputs as risks, and send inputs
back through the system to be implemented both efficiently and effectively.
In order to articulate these principles, courts have used the imagery of flags
as warnings for the board of directors.
For purposes of Caremark cases, a warning flag is a signal or other
indication that should be reasonably available to, and understood by, the
board of directors that further investigatory or other actions should be taken
in response. Stated more simply, a warning flag is a problem that a board
should know about and look into further. Warning flags have been a frequent
source of study in the corporate governance literature.274
271. Arnold & Wade, supra note 51 at 676; Mingers & White, supra note 35, at 1148.
272. Beer & Huse, supra note 32, at 84. Feedback is dependent on the presence of a
functioning system infrastructure in order to be effective. Richmond, supra note 26, at 143
(“Without the infrastructure, there can be no feedback system.”).
273. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate
Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 185-202 (2006)
(explaining how feedback loops improve performance through communication, control, and
a functioning system). Cf. Emily Gardner, Adaptive Management in the Face of Climate
Change and Endangered Species Protection, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 229, 248 (2013) (highlighting
a six-step feedback loop of “assessment, design of management actions and associated
monitoring and research, implementation of management according to design, monitoring,
evaluation of outcomes, and adjustment of management based on evaluation of initial
management actions” in the environmental context).
274. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103
MINN. L. REV. 2153, 2171-79 (2019) (discussing at length the importance of warning flags);
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Marchand relied significantly on warning flags in order to determine
whether their respective claims survived a motion to dismiss. Four separate
times, Marchand noted the board’s failure to consider both ‘yellow flags’
and ‘red flags’ about growing safety issues at the firm.275 A red flag is clearly
a warning about the presence of a material risk.276 A red flag is also a “signal
to slow down and apprise oneself of the nature of the risk and to adjust course
if necessary.”277 Red flags can originate from a compliance program report,
the initiation of a government lawsuit or investigation, a warning from
external auditors, aberrations in internally generated data, or a journalists
report citing illegal behavior.278 Information that courts would consider red
flags can originate from both internal and external sources, such as internal
reports from management or external changes to the legal environment.279
Marchand also specifically cited the presence of yellow flags as
relevant evidence.280 If red flags represent clear warnings about the presence
of a material risk, then yellow flags represent evidence that is a step down
from clear notices of caution. Yellow flags may indicate that boards need to
address indirect or second-order information, or attend to risks that require
some inference or inferential step in order to perceive clearly as risks to the
firm.281 Examples of yellow flags could include a sudden departure of a
compliance officer, reporting irregularities from an important function, rapid
change in compliance procedures, or the introduction of a new product in an
unfamiliar market. None of these are necessarily Caremark-triggering
liabilities on their own, but each raises the potential for problems such that
they warrant additional scrutiny by the board of directors. Inclusion of
yellow flags should not be a complete surprise to boards or their advising
attorneys, as the very judge who authored the Marchand opinion published

Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, Caremark’s Hidden Promise, 51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239, 275-81,
284-86 (2018) (similar).
275. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809, 811, 816, 822 (Del. 2019).
276. Michael J. Borden, Of Outside Monitors and Inside Monitors: The Role of Journalists
in Caremark Litigation, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 921, 935 (2013).
277. Id.
278. Id. (citing McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-21 (6th Cir. 2001)). See also Mitchell,
supra note 276, at 275–86 (exploring the role of red flags in governance cases in detail).
279. Mitchell, supra note 276, at 277.
280. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809, 811, 816, 822.
281. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Warning—Potential Danger Ahead!: A Business Judge’s
Starting List of Yellow Flags for the Conscientious Independent Director, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, 3d. Q. 2004, at 25 (defining as yellow flags “warning signals . . . that ought to trigger
concern and extra caution on your part”). These included related-party transactions, failure
to retain top advisers, tolerance of non-contributing board members, overburdened board
members, a request to rush a decision, or deficiencies in the flow of information. Id. at 26–
27.
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a list of potential yellow flags for boards in 2004.282
In Marchand, significant government investigations into food safety
predated Blue Bell’s listeria outbreak.283 In addition, troubling indications
were given to management by Blue Bell’s own tests.284 The board either
didn’t hear of the warnings or failed to take action on them when presented.
The board’s failure to receive notices of deficiencies in safety resulted in the
injury and death of customers was sufficient for the court to conclude the
plaintiffs met their pleading burden to survive dismissal of their complaint.285
In Clovis, the court specifically found that, assuming the truth of pled
facts, that the “[b]oard ignored red flags that Clovis was not adhering to the
clinical trial protocols, thereby placing FDA approval of the drug in
jeopardy.”286 Clovis required that, when a plaintiff alleges that a board failed
to monitor an implemented oversight system, it must show that a red flag of
non-compliance appeared before the board but the board ignored the warning
anyway.287 Such flags, Clovis warned, either have to be “waived in one’s
face or displayed so that they are visible to the careful observer.”288 Taking
its cue from Marchand, Clovis defined the careful observer as someone who
is focused on the mission of the company and its critical regulatory
challenges. 289 An expertly knowledgeable board ignoring significant
departures from established standards of clinical protocols appears to fall
readily into the red flag category.
The Chou court carefully details red flags that the board disregarded in
bad faith. 290 It found that the board of directors was on notice of a
compliance failure in the operations of Pharmacy from a report it received in
2008.291 The board did not respond to this red flag of potential health and
safety gaps. Then a more significant red flag was the qui tam suit filed by a
former ABC executive.292 The suit was filed in 2010 but the illegal pre-filled
syringe program continued in operation until 2014 because the board ignored
282. Id.
283. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 811–12.
284. E.g., id. at 811 (“But despite the critical nature of food safety for Blue Bell’s
continued success, the complaint alleges that management turned a blind eye to red and yellow
flags that were waved in front of it by regulators and its own tests. . . .”).
285. Id. at 824.
286. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL
4850188, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
287. Id. at *13.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Teamsters Local 443 Health Svcs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, C.A. No. 2019-0816-SG,
2020 WL 5028065 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020).
291. Id. at *20.
292. Id.

2021]

TOWARD A SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE

125

these red flags. The court concluded that these “allegations are sufficient to
reasonably infer that the Board consciously ignored red flags regarding the
Pre-Filled Syringe Program and its attendant mission critical compliance
risks.”293
Boards must become vexillologists of corporate governance. Boards
must know when flags appear, what they mean, and how they should
respond.294 Boards must also recognize that what constitutes a red or yellow
flag will change over time. This means that boards must remain continually
vigilant about what practices courts will deem sufficient warnings that
demand a board response. Information perceived as beneath the attention of
the board today may become the ‘yellow flags’ of warning tomorrow.
Similarly, the ‘yellow flags’ of warning today may become the critical ‘red
flags’ of immediate threat tomorrow. The identification, evaluation, and
response to red and yellow warning flags cannot happen effectively without
a system of compliance containing robust methods of feedback. That system
must reach from the organization to the board of directors and turn back
outward toward the organization.
IV. BUILDING A SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
With systems thinking emerging in Caremark cases, and the growth of
systems thinking in the literature, the time is ripe for development of a
systems architecture in corporate governance.
This Part will be divided into three sections. The first will focus on
system inputs that a board should be expected to receive in order to fulfill
their fundamental obligations. The second section will highlight board
processes, particularly those that function inside the ‘black box’ and treat
board members as individuals in a group rather than a monolith. These
processes will be necessary for boards to manage information effectively.
Information is of minimal use if it cannot influence decision making, and the
third section will explore how boards can ensure that their output and
293. Id. at *24.
294. One author has thoughtfully proposed a five-factor analysis in order to determine
whether a concern raises itself to the level of a red warning flag: “(1) the potential harm to the
company, (2) the time directors had to react, (3) the particular source of the red flag, (4) the
frequency of the red flag, and (5) the availability of the information in forming the red flag.”
Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate
Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 239 (2010). The author further remarks, “[b]y
focusing on these elements to establish a conscious disregard, a court would avoid finding
liability for a mere mismanagement of “business risk” and strike the correct balance between
director authority and shareholder accountability.” Id. at 239–40.
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instructions can effectively emanate from the board and reach the appropriate
stakeholders that can make board directives a reality.
A. Inputs to the Board of Directors
A board of directors denied information about the organization is
effectively blind. Boards without informational inputs cannot correct
company problems. Such boards also cannot monitor essential functions that
could most expose the corporation to liability. Boards must rely on
management as information intermediaries in order to get the inputs
necessary to be effective. The most obvious source of such information
would be the CEO of the organization. No other individual has a greater
firm-wide responsibility or considers broad strategic directions of the firm
more than the leader of the corporation. Filtered through subordinates, the
CEO should be, at least in theory, the dominant gateway for receiving
relevant inputs for the board of directors.
However, reporting information on compliance and monitoring issues,
especially when that information implies strategic mistakes or reflects
negatively on the c-suite, results in a divergence of interest between the CEO
and the board of directors. Essentially a principal-agent problem,295 the CEO
is incentivized to underweight the significance of bad news presented to the
board because it could impact the CEOs pay, benefits, or continued tenure
with the firm. CEOs are not only incentivized to take excessive risks, 296 they
may have the personality type that overvalues risky behavior and
undervalues both the cost of risks and the monitoring necessary to keep firm
risks at a minimum.297 This does not imply that CEOs are unable to provide
objective information, but only that boards should rely on diverse range of
inputs in order for it to meet its Caremark obligations.
Perhaps the most prominent source of information is the chief legal
295. The notion of the principal-agent problem in organizations traces its originals to the
seminal work of Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). See also
Eugene M. Fama, Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980)
(arguing that the separation of security ownership and control can be an efficient form of
economic organization).
296. Justin Chircop, Monica Tarsalewska & Angela Tzreciakiewcz, Are CEOs
Encouraged to Take Too Much Risk?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 14, 2020), https://clsbluesk
y.law.columbia.edu/2020/02/14/are-ceos-encouraged-to-take-too-much-risk/ [ps://perma.cc/
4V6P-BH29].
297. Steven Neil Kaplan & Morten Sorensen, Are CEOs Different? Characteristics of Top
Managers 11 (NBER, Working Paper No. w23832, 2017) (“CEOs are significantly more
likely . . . to be perceived as risk takers.”). Executives perceived as risk takers are also
associated with greater general ability, interpersonal skills, and charisma. Id. at 15.
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officer (CLO) of the enterprise. The modern CLO has great stature in the
executive suite, 298 trusted with a variety of functions ranging from dealmaker to litigator and crisis manager. 299 The CLO is also influential in
alleviating the principal-agent problem, a fundamental goal of the
monitoring function of corporate governance and the board of the
directors.300 CLOs often serve as the “gatekeepers” of corporate legality,
deterring misconduct by management and reporting such misconduct as
needed to the board of directors.301
The CLO has significant incentives that motivate her to perform the
monitoring function that boards require. Like other officers, the CLO has a
duty of care to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation.302
This also includes monitoring the activities of the company and investigating
misconduct.303 As an attorney, the CLO also has obligations under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, who is a “public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.”304 Attorneys may also be required
to withdraw representation if a client persists in action that the attorney
believes is criminal or fraudulent conduct. 305 Furthermore, the CLO’s
ultimate client is not individuals in management such as the CEO or CFO,
but rather the corporation itself.306
Another clear source of inputs for the board of directors is the rising
prominence of the chief compliance officer (CCO). While the CCO may or
may not be an attorney, her focus is specifically on the compliance and

298. See, e.g., A Guardian and A Guide, ECONOMIST (Apr. 7, 2012), https://www.eco
nomist.com/business/2012/04/07/a-guardian-and-a-guide/ [https://perma.cc/DCH3-KG33].
See also Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., The General Counsel as Lawyer-Statesman, HARV. L.
SCH. F. CORP. GOV. (Sep. 15, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/09/05/the-generalcounsel-as-lawyer-statesman/ [https://perma.cc/WU48-W3Q3] (“The ideal of the modern
general counsel is a lawyer-statesman who is an acute lawyer, a wise counselor and company
leader and who has a major role assisting the corporation achieve that fundamental fusion
which should, indeed, be the foundation of global capitalism.”).
299. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era
of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 219 (2016).
300. Id.
301. David A. Delman & Paul A. Bruno, Up the Ladder and Out the Door: Saying “No”
to the CEO, 46 INT’L LAW. 1007, 1018 (2012).
302. Bird & Park, supra note 301, at 221.
303. Id.
304. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020), available at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_
of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope/ [https://pe
rma.cc/WP9Z-95EA].
305. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(2–3).
306. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 21, 59 (2018).
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monitoring functions of the organization. This may include implementing
compliance programs, ensuring appropriate information reaches the right
constituents, training employees on evolving compliance obligations, and
performing investigations when compliance related misconduct occurs.
Unlike the CLO, the CCO may not have an attorney-client relationship with
the corporation,307 and will not be expected to serve as an advocate in the
face of litigation or government investigation. Also unlike the CLO, the
CCO is less likely to be in the cadre of senior management, instead serving
as a relatively autonomous management leader with a broad mandate to
prevent and remediate misconduct in the organization. 308 Compliance
leadership requires point-of-contact engagement with business practice, as
one CCO explained: “[c]ompliance is getting up out of your chair and
following your clients back into their business and making sure they really
are doing all of the things that you’ve advised them to do.”309
Ensuring sufficient inputs to the board of directors involves more than
simply designating the CLO, CCO, and perhaps other risk related officers310
as sources of Caremark-related information. Inputs must be clearly defined
by reporting lines and responsibilities in order to be adequate. A reporting
line is the designation of an individual or entity to whom an individual is in
some way responsible or accountable to in an organization.311
In order for Caremark-related inputs to effectively reach the board of

307. See, e.g., THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
PLANNERS, SEC ADVISER EXAMINATIONS—REGULAR INSPECTIONS § 6:3 n.4 (2020) (“Note
that the SEC does not recognize the attorney-client privilege as extending to the work of an
adviser’s CCO merely because the CCO is a lawyer.”) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); Panel IV: Compliance Officer Empowerment, 6 AM. U.
BUS. L. REV. 255, 262-63 (2017) [hereinafter Compliance Panel]; Robert F. Roach & Mara
Davis, Protecting Attorney-Client and Attorney Work-Product Privileges, City Bar Ctr. For
Continuing Legal Educ. (Feb. 28, 2012) (“[S]imply because a CCO is an attorney or reports
to the [general counsel] does not mean that his or her communications and work-product are
privileged from disclosure.”).
308. Alexandra Foster, Where the CCO Fits in the C-Suite: A Corporation’s Moral
Compass, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 175, 184 (2017).
309. Michele DeStefano, Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the Borders of
Lawyers’ Monopoly and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2977
(2014) (interviewing an anonymous CCO).
310. For example, firms may retain a chief risk officer, who identifies emerging risk,
ensures a firm’s risk exposure matches its risk appetite and manages the firm’s companywide
risk level. See Peter Green & Jeremy Jennings-Mares, IIF’s Final Report on Market Best
Practices for Financial Institutions and Financial Products, 27 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES
POL’Y REP. 1, 1 (2008).
311. See Reporting line, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, https://www.macmillandictionary.co
m/us/dictionary/american/reporting-line [https://perma.cc/Z8TZ-B3PU] (last visited Jan. 14,
2021) (defining “reporting line”).
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directors, relevant reporting lines must be robust. Most general counsel
agree that the CLO should have a direct reporting line to the CEO. 312 For
compliance and monitoring purposes, however, this may not be enough. A
CEO that has otherwise captured the board of directors may not convey
compliance and monitoring concerns from legal to the board. 313 Even if
these concerns are communicated, the CEO may not relay them with the
same urgency that a CLO might use to communicate an important
compliance matter. A CLO that reports to the CFO, who may already have
an unsettlingly cozy connection with prominent auditing firms,314 may not
be incentivized to convey compliance problems as robustly as the CCO or
CLO.315
In the new Caremark environment, CLO must have more than mere
“exposure” to the board of directors.316 A CLO should have dual reporting
lines both to the CLO and to the board of directors.317 Due to diverging
perspectives on risk and compliance, other c-suite members may perceive
this elevation as a threat.318 Boards must have the fortitude to push back
against management who challenge their decisions.319 CLOs must have the
fortitude to push back if a CEO entertains thoughts of excluding the
312. Veta T. Richardson, What Happens When GCs Aren’t Empowered, ACC DOCKET
(Jan. 01, 2019), https://www.accdocket.com/what-happens-when-gcs-arent-empowered [http
s://perma.cc/G5Q8-RFN6].
313. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 921, 935 (2007) (explaining “CEO capture” as the ability of the CEO to “dominate the
board. Over time, the board becomes a subset of her friends. She remains in place not so
much because her performance is up-to-snuff, but rather because her friends appreciate her
attributes”); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 291–92 (2004) (explaining how the board of directors
can be captured by the CEO).
314. Omari Scott Simmons, Chief Legal Officer 5.0, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1741, 1762
(2020).
315. See id. (explaining factors that impact a CLO’s effectiveness).
316. Richardson, supra note 314, at 3 (suggesting “exposure at the board level” at a
minimum would elevate the status of the CLO and the firm’s commitment to compliance and
ethics).
317. Simmons, supra note 316, at 1762.
318. Supra note 316, at 1762–63.
319. See Cynthia A. Montgomery & Rhonda Kaufman, The Board’s Missing Link, HARV.
BUS. REV., Mar. 2003, at 86 (explaining that boards have traditionally been perceived as
“friends, acquaintances, and former colleagues of the CEO who basically provided a sounding
board with very little push back in the way of real constructive tension or independent thought
leadership.”); John Okray, A Discussion with Steven Walker, General Counsel, Secretary, and
Head of Board Advisory Services at the National Association of Corporate Directors, 61 FED.
LAW. 48, 49 (2014) (explaining that board members “should not be afraid to provide
constructive tension and question management”).
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company’s top attorney from meetings with the board of directors.320
This reporting line should be specific and periodic, with a report by the
CLO a regularized part of the full board’s regular agenda. This reporting
line should be periodic, require an opt-in or be otherwise burdened with
nudges that push the CLO away from the center of important board
conversations. If the CLO has to request a meeting with the board, for
example, she knows that such a request will raise a red flag amongst fellow
c-suite executives. However, CLOs may not want to raise that red flag
because of their desire to “get along” with their fellow business executives.321
Just as boards can be captured by CEOs, so can CLOs be captured by the
norms and goals of fellow executives.322
Whereas formal reporting lines are important for a CLO in order to
communicate Caremark-related inputs to the board, such reporting lines are
critical for the CCO.323 While the CLO has been a fixture in organizations
since the nineteenth century,324 the CCO is a relative newcomer, with little
of the reputation cachet held by an organizations’ top lawyer. The CCO also
does not yet have an established place in the group of elite executives that
report directly to the CEO. Finally, the CCO’s role as guardian of the legal
and ethical integrity of the enterprise may put the CCO at odds with cultures
in more traditional departments that emphasize risk taking and value creation
over risk minimization and value protection.
In addition, the CCO may be the very manager from which the board
receives the most information to satisfy their Caremark duties. The
position’s focus in part on monitoring and audit may result in the CCO being
the first high-level manager to ferret out misconduct. Unshackled by the
complicating attorney-client relationship a CLO has to the enterprise,325 the
CCO can speak freely, and perhaps sometimes disconcertingly, about any
320. See Joshua Nimmo, Ethical Regulation for Financial Lawyers: Negative
Certification as a Response to the Financial Crisis, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL E THICS 745, 764 (2015)
(advocating for a negative certification process that would enhance attorney due diligence to
reduce risk).
321. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 195 (2006) (explaining in-house counsel’s vulnerability to capture and the
erosion of gatekeeping roles).
322. See Bird & Park, supra note 301, at 243 (explaining that firm culture may encourage
attorneys to subordinate their professional role and implicitly perceive that management,
rather than the corporation, is the appropriate client).
323. Compliance Panel, supra note 309, at 260; Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance
in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2095 (2016) (calling reporting lines
a “critical aspect of effective compliance”).
324. Deborah A. Demott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
955, 958 & n.14 (2005) (chronicling the history of the general counsel).
325. See supra notes 286–290 and accompanying text.
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misconduct to the board of directors.
These factors compel the CCO to have a reporting line to the board of
directors.326 This reporting line can be either a “straight line” or a “dotted
line” report to the full board or a relevant board subcommittee such as audit
or compliance. 327 This information flow enables information from the
CCO’s subordinates to pass freely from their desks to the company board.328
Even with the increasing pressure that boards face regarding compliance
obligations, such a requirement, although common, is not yet a universal
practice in organizations.329
B. Processes for Board of Directors Decision Making
A board cannot simply collect information about compliance and
monitoring practices in order to protect itself from a Caremark claim. A
board must have effective processes to adequately respond to information
received. Fortunately, information is readily available about best practices
in corporate governance. For example, the Business Roundtable has
articulated detailed guidelines for effective corporate governance practices
in their Principles of Corporate Governance. 330
Among other
recommendations, the document recommends optimal roles for the board
and management respectively, the roles of audit, governance, and other
committees, as well as engagement with long-term shareholders on issues of

326. Compliance Panel, supra note 309, at 260 (transcribing statement by law firm
panelist: “Reporting lines are so critical and the CCO in my view should report through either
a direct line or a dotted line to a committee of the board or to the board itself or to an
independent committee of the board, preferably an audit committee of the Board of
Directors.”).
327. Id. See also Miriam H. Baer, Compliance Elites, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1600 n.3
(2020) (“The term, ‘dotted-line reporting’ ordinarily describes an informal, looser reporting
relationship between the CCO and the company’s board of directors, whereby the CCO can
relay information of importance directly to the board, rather than going through the CEO or
general counsel.”); Priscilla Claman, Are you Considering a Job with Two Managers?, HARV.
BUS. REV., May 13, 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/05/are-you-considering-a-job-with/ [https://p
erma.cc/YQX6-GBQJ] (“In . . . organizational structures, you typically have two bosses: a
‘straight-line’ direct boss, who is the person who prepares your performance review and
decides on your raise; and a ‘dotted-line’ boss, who may also assign you work but has less
control over your review.”).
328. Griffith, supra note 325, at 2095.
329. Id. at 2102 & n.116 (citing a 2014 study reporting that 79% of CCOs have a dotted
reporting line to the board of directors).
330. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3-4 (Aug. 2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/Principles-of-Corporate-Governance-2016.pdf/ [https://pe
rma.cc/C3YR-UCAV].
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corporate concern. 331 There are also a number of online sources that
summarize best practices for boards.332 These include implementing clear
written mandates and responsibilities for board members, separation of the
roles of the CEO and Chair of the Board, and the assignment of each director
to an area of focus in their respective subcommittees.333 Regulatory matters
are discussed either quarterly or at every board meeting in nearly half of
boards surveyed.334
Boards report implementation of forward-looking practices that are
engaged with business and societal trends. Many surveyed boards are
seeking to increase their racial and gender diversity.335 A majority of boards
have specifically allocated cyber risk, corporate social responsibility,
sustainability, and social impact risks to the agendas of relevant
subcommittees.336 A majority of boards do report that they receive results
from culture surveys, review investigation findings, and receive information
about reports from company hotlines.337 An increasing number of boards are
implementing evaluations of individual board of directors. 338 Board
processes appear to be generally robust, and are poised to improve over time.
Yet beneath the surface of future promises are troubling reports that
question the effectiveness of such processes in practice. A significant
number of directors self-report that they lack the full information they need
to make effective decisions. 339 Only thirty-seven percent of directors
reported that their board is fully cognizant of the organization’s plan to

331. Id. at 3.
332. See, e.g., The Top 5 Corporate Governance Best Practices That Benefit Every
Company, MCINNES COOPER (Sep. 16, 2014), https://www.mcinnescooper.com/publications/l
egal-update-the-top-5-corporate-governance-best-practices-that-benefit-every-company/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/9JCE-DHKM] (summarizing corporate best practices); The Public Company
Handbook: A Corporate Governance and Disclosure Guide for Directors and Executives Fifth Edition, PERKINS COIE (5th ed. 2016), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/chapter-7corporate-governance-best-practices-in-the-boardroom.html/ [https://perma.cc/7Y54-M9PG]
(summarizing best practices in chapter 7).
333.Id.; PERKINS COIE, supra note 334.
334. DELOITTE & SOC’Y FOR CORP. GOV., BOARD PRACTICES REPORT: COMMON THREADS
ACROSS BOARDROOMS 6 (2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/center-for-boardeffectiveness/articles/us-board-practices-report-common-threads.html
[https://perma.cc/4NNG-6DUU].
335. Id. at 16.
336. Id. at 6.
337. Id.
338. SPENCER STUART, 2020 U.S. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 24 (2020), https://www.
spencerstuart.com/-/media/2020/december/ssbi2020/2020_us_spencer_stuart_board_index.p
df [https://perma.cc/P4XF-2BJH] [hereinafter Board Index].
339. David A. Nadler, Building Better Boards, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2004, at 102, 110.
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manage a crisis.340 Only half of surveyed directors believed that their board
fully comprehended issues related to environmental and social governance,
and even fewer believed that these issues have a financial impact on the
organization.341 Board succession plans are an important concern, but fewer
than half of board members report that succession plans are shared with the
entire board of directors.342 Boards also have a troubling habit of ducking
difficult conversations regarding the performance of individual directors and
whether a given director should be reappointed.343 Whether due to dominant
personalities or a hesitance to erode collegiality, over one-third of board
members reported difficultly in raising a dissenting opinion in board
meetings.344 A recent survey of corporate directors found that almost half of
board members think that at least one fellow director should be replaced.345
What is the source of this dichotomy? Although boards may be
governed by formal processes, there may be informal processes and effects
that nonetheless erode board effectiveness. A board of directors is, at its
core, a team. Whereas a group is a collection of individuals defined by colocation or common identity, a team is a collection of individuals with
specialized areas of expertise who work toward a common goal.346 The team
otherwise known as a board of directors is typically comprised of a large
group of elite and well-educated people who meet periodically to address
and resolve complex questions.347 Teams in organizations can generate a
variety of positive effects ranging from high productivity to lower
turnover.348
340. PWC, TURNING CRISIS INTO OPPORTUNITY, PWC’S 2020 ANNUAL CORPORATE
DIRECTOR’S SURVEY 4 (2020), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/governance-insights-cen
ter/assets/pwc-2020-annual-corporate-directors-survey.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/4VGU-7GSB].
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 16.
345. Id. at 4.
346. See, e.g., Deborah C. Saltman et al., Groups or Teams in Health Care: Finding the
Best Fit, 13 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 55, 55-56 (2006) (explaining the difference
between groups and teams). See also Building a Winning Board Team, STARBOARD
LEADERSHIP CONSULTING LLC, https://www.starboardleadership.com/board-chair-companio
n/building-a-winning-board-team/ [https://perma.cc/4GNK-MYBW] (“A well-functioning
board of directors is very much like a successful sports team—a group of talented individuals,
each with unique and complementary strengths, all setting aside their personal agendas to help
the entire organization achieve success.”).
347. Forbes & Milliken, supra note 19, at 492.
348. See, e.g., Linda I. Glassop, The Organizational Benefits of Teams, 55 HUM. REL. 225,
246 (2002) (finding that team structures in organizations are associated with higher
productivity, reduced turnover, and a flatter management structure). See generally A.W.
Richter, J.F. Dawson & M.A. West, The Effectiveness of Teams in Organizations: A Meta-
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Although board members acting as a team can improve decision
making, boards are no less vulnerable to social-psychological factors that
can inhibit any group’s effectiveness.349 Some boards can be so driven by
conflict between board members that otherwise rational decision-making
processes are suppressed. 350 Instead, “[b]ehind-the-scenes coalition
building, off-line lobbying, withholding of information, attempting to
change decision positions through private cooptation, and controlling
agendas” take over board discourse.351 Boards embroiled in conflict engage
with formal processes, but do so in fashion that emphasizes intra-group
factional victories over the long-term success of the enterprise.352
Boards can also be dangerously disengaged with the weaknesses and
threats facing the enterprise. Such boards can have formal processes in
place, but rely too much on management or the CEO to direct the strategic
goals of the company.353 Such boards may be unfamiliar with many aspects
of the company such that, even if the board chose to rely on formal processes,
its decisions would be impaired by a cloud of ignorance.354 The protective
shields of the broadly-interpreted business judgment rule, the duty of loyalty,
and the duty of care have arguably allowed board disengagement to
flourish.355 Described as a disengaged or caretaker board, such boards are
poorly involved in initiatives important to the CEO or shareholders. 356
Boards can even devolve into a “gentleman’s club” that emphasizes
ceremony and conformity over actual decision making.357 They also appear
Analysis, 22 INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 2749 (2011) (conducting a literature review of
analyses of team performance in organizations).
349. Forbes & Milliken, supra note 19, at 492. See also Diane Coutu, Why Teams Don’t
Work, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2009, at 98 (explaining physchological conditions that
determine team success and failure).
350. Bernard C. Bailey & Simon I. Peck, supra note 16, at 136 (classifying this type of
behavior as a “contested board”).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 136–37.
353. Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L.
REV. 783, 811 (1994).
354. Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance Failures and the Managerial Duty of Care,
76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 767, 781–82 (2002) (citing Enron’s board of directors as an example).
355. Samuel R. Foreman, Bored Boards: The Directorial Disengagement Dilemma, 50
WASHBURN L.J. 147, 149–51 (2010).
356. Morten Huse, Relational Norms as a Supplement to Neo-Classical Understanding of
Directorates: An Empirical Study of Boards of Directors, 22 J. SOCIO-ECON. 219, 225 (1993);
John A. Pearce II & Shaker A. Zahra, The Relative Power of CEOs and Boards of Directors:
Associations with Corporate Governance, 12 STRAT. MGMT. J. 135, 136 (1991).
357. Nadler, supra note 340, at 104 (“And everyone knows what boards should be: seats
of challenge and inquiry that add value without meddling and make CEOs more effective but
not all-powerful.”).
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poised to be held liable through Caremark-related litigation.
Boards are also ideal environments for homogeneity to thrive. In part
based on an innate tendency toward homophily, 358 board members tend to
have similar ideologies, social status, and cultural backgrounds.359 They also
share the common interest of seeking and maintaining a position on a
board.360 This can result in team cohesiveness, but it can also cause a mode
of processing information becomes so dominant that it smothers realistic
appraisals of alternative courses of action.361
Board processes especially matter for boards because the very nature of
board activities makes them uniquely vulnerable to process losses. Boards
are typically comprised of large groups of people. The larger a group
becomes, the more difficult it is to implement processes that are effective for
all members of that group. A board is also a group that meets only
sporadically,362 limiting the benefit of any cumulative knowledge effects that
can arise from repeated interaction with a subject. Furthermore, whether
serving on individual committees or meeting as the full group, board
members are interdependent of each other in their review and evaluation of
information. 363 If a single board member or a small group shirk their
responsibilities in the evaluation of information or process, it can erode the
effectiveness of other board members. Finally, topics that merit sustained
board attention are rarely cut and dry. Boards must struggle with difficult
problems that lack an easy answer.364 Boards depend on process in order to
work, and the absence of effective processes can slide boards into
dysfunction. These social-psychological factors and process losses,
fundamental forces in the systems architecture of any organization, can be
the undoing for boards that unexpectedly find themselves on the receiving
end of a Caremark claim.
Boards must address social-psychological challenges in order for their
formal processes to work effectively. The first and perhaps most effective

358. Homophily is the tendency of similar people to associate with one another. For an
in-depth examination of homophily, see Gueorgi Kossinets & Duncan J. Watts, Origins of
Homophily in an Evolving Social Network, 115 AM. J. SOC. 405 (2009).
359. Andrew Howard, Groupthink and Corporate Governance Reform: Changing the
Formal and Informal Decisionmaking Processes of Corporate Boards, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 425, 428–29 (2011).
360. Id. at 429.
361. Id. at 428.
362. Forbes & Milliken, supra note 17, at 492.
363. Id. See also Ruth Wageman, Interdependence and Group Effects, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
145–47 (1995) (explaining the concept of group-related interdependence in depth).
364. Alessandro Minichilli et al., Board Task Performance: An Exploration of Micro- and
Macro-Level Determinants of Board Effectiveness, 33 J. ORG. BEHAV. 193, 196 (2012).

136

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:1

reform boards can make is the abolition of groupthink. Groupthink is a way
of thinking that embeds a dominant mode of processing information so
firmly within a group or culture that it overrides realistic appraisals of
alternative courses of action. 365 Boards can eliminate groupthink by
formalizing the devil’s advocate role at every board meeting. 366 Board
members can take turns shouldering this contrarian responsibility during
board discussions. 367 This discourages blunt challenges from being
perceived as a personal attack on someone else’s idea, thereby sustaining the
important norm of collegiality that is fundamental to making boards
successful.
Proper framing of discussions can also discourage groupthink. Framing
is a process by which individuals develop a particular perspective or
orientation about their thinking on a particular issue.368 Frames contextualize
events, shape attitudes, and influence discourse, ultimately generating an
“organiz[ation of] everyday reality.”369 For example, when a company labels
a product “75% fat free” instead of “25% fat,” and consumers state a
preference for the “fat free” labeled product over the “fat amount” labeled
product, that company is framing a product attribute in order to persuade.370
Boards can use framing with similar effectiveness during board
meetings. When initially raising issues for discussion, boards should adopt
a neutral posture towards the subject in order to avoid influencing other
board members through framing of the issue. An expression of initial
preferences by the board member raising the issue can discourage open
inquiry by the board or a subcommittee that must address it. 371 Similarly,
expressing expectations for a board’s engagement with an issue can

365. Irving Janis, Groupthink of Irving Janis, in A FIRST LOOK AT COMMUNICATION
THEORY 235, 237 (E. Griffin ed. 1991); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
MAG., 1971, at 43.
366. Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233, 1304–06 (2003).
367. Id. at 1304.
368. Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL’Y SCI.
103, 104 (2007).
369. Id. at 106.
370. See Irwin P. Levin & Gary Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the Framing of
Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 374,
374 (1988) (finding a consumer preference for ground beef labelled “75% lean” over a product
labelled “25% fat”). See also Chris Janiszewski, Tim Silk & Alan D.J. Cooke, Different
Scales for Different Frames: The Role of Subjective Scales and Experience in Explaining
Attribute-Framing Effects, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 311, 311–13 (2003) (reviewing framing
literature).
371. Janis, supra note 366, at 75.
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discourage the board from thinking out of the box on a subject.372
Once an issue is evaluated, boards can also establish a “last chance”
discussion of the issue.373 During this discussion, board members are given
the opportunity to air any residual doubts or concerns over the decision
made.374 This also allows the board to rethink the issue one more time,
perhaps with the clarity of new reflection, before a final decision is made to
commit to a certain strategy. 375 Decisions that appear particularly
comfortable or self-reinforcing to the board should be given extra scrutiny.376
This is not because the board lacks competence in making decisions, but
rather because decisions that appear on the surface to be routine can
discourage serious scrutiny that can prevent bad decision making.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, boards must cultivate a
culture that encourages the expression, deliberation, and resolution of
dissent. The presence of dissent is healthy for organizations.377 Dissent in
groups can force individuals to justify their ideas with objective information
instead of their own personal preferences. 378 A “culture of candor”
encourages not only frank discussions but a genuine reliance on formal
processes that protect the board from mismanagement.379 Such a culture can
also enable board to communicate candid messages to management and also
signal to management that the board is engaged, independent, and
monitoring the organization. 380 A board accustomed to candor and healthy
levels of disagreement can be more effectively primed to resist the “shimmer
effect” of letting charismatic CEOs run amok free of board restraint. 381
Executives do not like listening to contrarians, making the boards’ role as a
check on management rapacity even more important to the organization.382

372. Id.
373. Id. at 76.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Avery Blank, 3 Ways to Avoid Groupthink (and Gain Respect), FORBES (Jan. 21,
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/averyblank/2020/01/21/3-ways-to-avoid-groupthink-an
d-gain-respect/. See also Janis, supra note 366, at 76 (discussing remedies against groupthink
in organizational decision-making).
377. Garry Emmons, Encouraging Dissent in Decision-Making, HARV. BUS. SCH.
WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 1, 2007), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/encouraging-dissent-in-de
cision-making [https://perma.cc/AD7U-8NLF].
378. Bird & Park, supra note 301, at 54 (citing Augustin Landier, David Sraer & David
Thesmar, Optimal Dissent in Organizations, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 761, 762 (2009)).
379. James O’Toole & Warren Bennis, What’s Needed Next: A Culture of Candor, HARV.
BUS. REV., Jun. 2009, at 54, 58–60.
380. Id. at 56.
381. Id. at 57.
382. Id. at 61.
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A culture of candor vividly displayed by a board can also serves as a model
for management and the rest of the organization to follow. 383 The
responsibility to imbue a company with a culture of candor begins and ends
with the board of directors. 384 Without such a culture, even the most
thorough processes may not be enough to prevent mismanagement that can
trigger Caremark-related claims.
C. Board Outputs to Management and the Organization
Even the most process sensitive and engaged board of directors cannot
be effective if their system outputs, typically directives to management to
take or refrain from a certain action, are not implemented in the organization.
Boards are not involved in the direct implementation of their directives. The
output that boards produce is thus “entirely cognitive in nature.” 385 As a
result, initiatives to optimize the effectiveness of board output must
significantly rely on cognitive processes in order to function effectively.
Boards are usually not lacking for business experience or intellectual
vigor. Board members of large companies are typically comprised of
working or retired CEOs, as well as experienced executives and other
leaders.386 Compliance is certainly a subject with which company leaders
have familiarity. However, that knowledge does not necessarily mean that
boards are fully knowledgeable about how to issue the most effective boarddriven directives about compliance to an organization.
Knowledge gaps can appear due to compliance acting as a distinct
function that has traditionally been the domain of lawyers and other legally
educated personnel rather than individuals trained primarily in business.
This gap between formal legal requirements and the skillset of
businesspeople who are supposed to comply with those requirements is
wider than legal professionals think. 387 Businesspeople may more likely
perceive lawyers as hired guns that defend lawsuits than proactive

383. Joel Katz, Creating a Speak-Up Culture, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Apr. 1, 2013), https://
www.complianceweek.com/creating-a-speak-up-culture/3990.article [https://perma.cc/VSN
9-MRFT] (“The commitment to foster an environment where employees feel comfortable
escalating concerns must begin with a company’s board of directors and executive
management. From there, it cascades down through the organization.”).
384. O’Toole & Bennis, supra note 379, at 61.
385. Forbes & Milliken, supra note 19, at 492.
386. See, e.g., BOARD INDEX, supra note 340, at 9 (providing statistics on the functional
backgrounds of new S&P 500 independent directors).
387. Robert C. Bird, The Many Futures of Legal Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 575, 578
(2010).
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proponents of a robust compliance function.388 Furthermore, while lawyers
were once consistent members of boards of directors, their influence on
boards fluctuates over time, and board members cannot necessarily
guarantee that they will have adequately trained legal counsel in the room
when making decisions.389 There are also a variety of arguments that some
have made against lawyers belonging in the boardroom, including that there
is no room for lawyers to participate, lawyers are not businesspeople, and
lawyers are too specialized, and lawyers focus too much on the minutiae to
be effective.390
Without the guiding hand of counsel of the board room, and a
knowledge gap between law and business, the compliance function can
appear more foreign to board members than other functions of the enterprise.
Faced with making difficult decisions related to compliance and monitoring
of the company, board members are already constrained by time pressures
imposed by crowded board agendas.391 Board members also have their own
personal obligations that limit their attention to a given firm’s board
service.392 These constraints, in conjunction with the previously highlighted
board pressures to avoid dissent or uncomfortable topics,393 may encourage
board members to take mental shortcuts that undermine good decision
making.394
Board decisions can also be tainted by confirmation bias, the tendency

388. Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 4 (2008).
389. See Ashby Jones, Law-Firm Lawyers Kissing Their Board Seats Goodbye, WALL. ST.
J. (Jan. 30, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113823471859156442 [https://perma.cc/3
935-FP2M]. See also Scott B. Guernsey et al., Banking on the Lawyers 49 (Cornell Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 20-13, 2020) (finding that lawyer-directors at banks are
associated with management of bank risk and significant increase in firm value).
390. See Do Lawyers Belong in the Boardroom as Non-Executive Directors?,
SPENCERSTUART (July 2013), https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/do-law
yers-belong-in-the-boardroom-as-non-executive-directors [https://perma.cc/3NVK-DL5M]
(summarizing arguments both for and against a lawyer’s presence in the boardroom).
391. See Lawrence Loh, The Crowded Agenda of Corporate Governance, ETHICAL
BOARDROOM, https://ethicalboardroom.com/the-crowded-agenda-of-corporate-governance/
[https://perma.cc/X8HB-CN7H] (advocating for reduction of “governance clutter”).
392. Board members are nothing if not busy people. Eliezier M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani,
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 51 J. FIN. 689, 695-96 (2006) (sampling directors of
large U.S. public companies and finding that over half of outside directors serve on three or
more boards at once).
393. See supra Part IV.B.
394. Dale E. Jones & Ralph Weber, Memo to Boards: Here’s How to Avoid Confirmation
Bias, DIVERSIFIED SEARCH GROUP (Dec. 21, 2019), https://diversifiedsearch.com/insights/per
spectives/memo-to-boards-heres-how-to-avoid-confirmation-bias/ [https://perma.cc/R2JB-T
ULX]. For a detailed explanation of the perils of such mental shortcuts, see DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
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by group members to rely on information that confirms their initial opinions
or a desired conclusion.395 Applied to compliance, confirmation bias can
encourage the unfounded conclusion that there are no compliance problems
in the company. Reaching such a conclusion is tempting even in the face of
contradictory evidence: it is not only a desirable result for conflict-free board
meetings but also mentally the path of least resistance.
The result of these cognitive and other pressures can result in the
dangerously superficial practice of checkbox compliance masquerading as
board outputs. Checkbox compliance is a decision-making process that
encourages conformance to a set of standards with little regard to the spirit
or purpose for which the standards were devised.396 Predictable preferences
undermine authentic decision-making that enable board monitoring to
function.397 Checkbox compliance improperly elevates form over function,
symbolism over reality, and process over outcome. The goal of checkbox
compliance can be to plow through monitoring issues as expeditiously as
possible so that more time can be dedicated to the “important” subjects of
strategy and operations.
Boards can conduct checkbox compliance in a variety of ways. A board
may spend a specific period of time on compliance issues only because the
agenda requires it, rather than any specific motivation to evaluate a firm’s
compliance function. Discussions of compliance matters may be substantive
in name only and performed only for the purpose of showing that board
minutes reflected a ‘discussion’ of the compliance function in order to
deflect accusations of mismanagement. Boards can also raise discussion of
compliance issues with the belief that no problems exist already firmly in the
minds of board members.
In order for boards to produce effective outputs that have a meaningful
impact on the enterprise, boards must transform their understanding of the
compliance and monitoring functions. First, and perhaps foremost, boards
must dispatch any perception that compliance is merely a checkbox to
complete. The compliance function is not just a necessary evil, but a critical
part of the proper functioning of any organization.398
395. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 76 TULANE L. REV. 1363, 1401–02 (2002).
396. See Chong Ee, Checkbox Compliance, 67 INTERNAL AUDITOR 55, 55–56 (2010)
(explaining how compliance processes in organizations sometimes favor form over
substance).
397. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 436 (2006)
(discussing tools to improve administrative accountability).
398. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 301, 302 n.65 (2017).
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Matters of compliance must be given substantive time and energy on
board agendas, even if that agenda already appears crowded with other
matters that compete for the board’s time. Compliance decision making
should not be oversimplified merely because problems with compliance have
not occurred in the past. Any outputs that the board makes to management
and beyond should be developed with regularized involvement with key
legal and compliance professionals such as the CLO and CCO.
Once boards have embraced compliance as a matter of substantive
importance, boards must also treat compliance with the sophistication that it
requires. Boards must recognize that compliance is more complex than
ensuring a company meets a certain standard and that not every noncompliant practice encountered should be completed the same. Rather than
binary states of legality and illegality, governance is better understood as a
continuum of possibilities, which each possibility demanding a different
response.399 For example, firms that are slightly out of compliance may
merely require trivial actions handled entirely by management and outside
the purview of the board.400 By contrast, non-compliance that significantly
deviates from standards may require action by the board and a rethinking of
the policies that led to the noncompliance. States of critical non-compliance
can trigger severe penalties, harmful negative publicity, and a long-term loss
of status in the industry, and may require immediate and decisive action by
boards. Firms can even be in substantial over-compliance with regulatory
standards.401 This can provide a measure of safety against wrongdoing, but
can also drain unnecessary resources and frustrate goal-focused
employees.402 Regardless of the condition, a board’s output must encourage
a calibrated reporting and monitoring system by which employees are
empowered and trusted to both solve a problem themselves when appropriate
and also feel fully free to take matters to a responsive board when
circumstances dictate.403
Boards must also be comfortable with managing risk pragmatically and
given limited available temporal and monetary resources. 404 Boards will
399. Id. at 286–87.
400. Id. at 291.
401. Id. at 307.
402. Id. at 307–08.
403. Id. at 291 (citing Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 535–36 (2002)).
404. See DELOITTE, THE RISK INTELLIGENT ENTERPRISE: ERM DONE RIGHT 7 (2013)
[hereinafter ERM DONE RIGHT], https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/D
ocuments/Governance-Risk-Compliance/dttl-grc-riskintelligent-erm-doneright.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/J3EU-H5U7] (explaining that in evaluating response to risk, “[r]esource
availability and allocation will, of course, need to be primary factors in these considerations”).
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have to manage these limitations by triaging governance risks according to
their severity and likelihood and recommend appropriate policies to
management. Risks that are looming and substantial require sustained and
rigorous oversight. Visualization tools such as heat maps can not only help
boards evaluate and triage relevant threats, but help the board perceive more
clearly perceive firm risks in relation to one another.405 This encourages the
board to promote mitigating the greatest amount of risk relative to the cost
necessary to mitigate it.406 Risk intelligent board members and executives
should have a comfort level with risk that allows them to be confident that
their carefully risk-assessed decisions will be supported by relevant
stakeholders.407
Finally, boards must understand that any system of governance must be
customized to the firm’s unique needs. It is not uncommon for board
members to serve on boards of multiple companies. 408 However, what
requires monitoring at one organization may be entirely different than the
governance demands of another. Although laws typically apply to all
enterprises within a jurisdiction, each board must manage its own custom
challenges for conforming to legal rules.409 Whereas intellectual property
may be a high priority for a pharmaceutical firm, for example, it may be of
little relevance to a trucking company. As a firm grows from small to
medium size, various carve outs exempting small firms from compliance
obligations may disappear, requiring firms to deal with a new group of rules.

405. See Richard Acello, In the Matrix, 100 A.B.A. J. 33, 33 (2014) (describing a risk
matrix used by law firm Ropes & Gray in the FCPA context that evaluates on a “heat-map
basis where your biggest risks are . . . so clients can align their compliance resources with
developing trends”); Dimitris Karagiannis et al., Compliance Evaluation Featuring Heat
Maps (CE-HM): A Meta-Modeling-Based Approach, 7328 LECTURE NOTES IN COMP. SCI. 414
(2012) (depicting heat maps); Ahmed Awad & Mathias Weske, Visualization of Compliance
Violation in Business Process Models, 43 LECTURE NOTES IN BUS. INFO. PROCESSING 182
(2009) (depicting various visualization models); Gerlinde Berger-Walliser et al., Promoting
Business Success Through Contract Visualization, 17 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 67, 68 (2011)
(describing the benefits of visualization in the contractual context).
406. Bird & Park, supra note 398, at 313.
407. See ERM DONE RIGHT, supra note 406, at 5 (discussing the increased attention on
risk management from boards of directors and stakeholders).
408. See, e.g., Sean Barry, Are Board Members Overcommitted?, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOV. (Aug. 9, 2018) (stating that “approximately 19% of Russell 3000 board members
currently occupy more than one board seat, making it far from an oddity for a director to sit
on multiple boards”); Anna Bergman Brown et al., Are Directors Holding Multiple Board
Seats Too Busy or Well-Connected?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 24, 2018), https://clsblu
esky.law.columbia.edu/2018/05/24/are-directors-holding-multiple-board-seats-too-busy-orwell-connected/ [https://perma.cc/3CPY-H45B] (noting that “[d]irectors frequently hold
multiple board seats, simultaneously lending their expertise to the boards of multiple firms”).
409. Bird, supra note 179, at 74.
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The result is a unique “regulatory risk mix” which boards must first
understand and then apply to the firm’s business units. 410 As the firm’s
business units and interests change, so do the governance demands of the
enterprise. Boards must produce outputs that are tailored to the firm’s needs.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern corporate governance should be viewed through the lens of a
system. A systems approach perceives governance as a collection of inputs,
processes, and outputs that take in and convey information to stakeholders.
The systems idea is not purely theoretical, the recent cases of Marchand v.
Barnhill and the governance quartet show that courts are perceiving boards’
governance obligations through the lens of systems language. How much
change the courts will embrace remains to be seen, but a broader view of
Caremark claims is now emerging, and systems thinking is a part of that
change. The governance quartet may soon become a quintet, an octet, or
beyond, as an increasing number of lower courts take the lead of Marchand
and its progeny.
This interpretive shift is not merely theoretical. Changes in court
interpretation of Caremark claims require a response from boards. A number
of strategies are available for boards to respond to this call for systems
thinking. A board that perceives governance as a continuous process
customized to the firm’s needs and managed within the context of risk
intelligence will be the most successful. A board that does not embrace
systems thinking does so at its peril and exposes itself to liability over the
long-term.

410. Bird, supra note 179, at 74.

